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## Report of Major-General Carter L. Stevenson of the Tennessee Campaign.

[We print the following report from General Stevenson's own MS. Its value is increased by the fact that this account of the operations of the division of this accomplished soldier on that memorable campaign has never before been published in any form, so far as we know.]

HEADQUARTERS STEVENSON'S DIVISION,

*"In the field,"* January 20th, 1865.

Major—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division during the recent campaign in Tennessee:

The march from Palmetto to the front of Columbia was without incident worthy of mention, except, perhaps, the demonstration upon Resaca, Georgia, in which my command acted with spirit in the skirmishing which resulted in driving the enemy within their works. My loss was numerically insignificant at this point, but amongst the killed was numbered the gallant soldier and genial gentleman, Colonel F. K. Beck, Twenty-third Alabama regiment. By his fall my division lost a chivalrous soldier and his native State one of her worthiest sons.

Upon our arrival in front of Columbia, my position in line was assigned from the right of the Mount Pleasant pike, the front of the division in line of battle. The investment was characterized by nothing of interest, as far as my division was concerned. A desultory skirmish fire was kept up most of the time. My losses here were few.

On the night of the 27th November, my scouts reported that there were indications that the enemy were evacuating Columbia. I immediately increased the number of scouts, and about an hour before day sent forward the Eighteenth and Third Tennessee regiments (consolidated), under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Butler. He found the reports of the scouts to be correct,

and occupied the town without opposition. I then moved forward my division, except Cumming's brigade (commanded on the campaign by Colonel E. P. Watkins, Fifty-sixth Georgia), which, by General Lee's order, was sent down the river to press those of the enemy who had taken that route, and endeavor to save the railroad bridge, which, however, had been fired before their arrival. In the fort at Columbia we secured a large amount of howitzer and small arm ammunition and two siege howitzers. Colonel Butler had immediately upon gaining possession of the town sent a force to the ford of Duck river. The enemy's skirmishers were found to be in large force on the opposite bank and the enemy in position behind works about three-quarters of a mile from the river. He immediately moved down his command, and skirmished with them briskly. The Sixtieth North Carolina, coming up soon after, was sent further up the bank of the river to a point from which they obtained a flanking fire upon the enemy. This drove them back from the immediate bank of the river. Orders were soon after received to discontinue the skirmishing. On the night of that day, General Hood, with Cheatham's and Stuart's corps and Johnson's division of Lee's corps, crossed Duck river some miles above Columbia, and pushed for the enemy's rear, leaving General Lee, with Clayton's and my division to occupy the enemy in front until he should have reached his position, then to force a crossing of the river and attack the enemy as he attempted to extricate himself. The greater part of the next day was spent in preparations for this movement. The bank of the river was quite steep on the side held by the enemy. A pontoon boat, in charge of Captain Ramsay, engineer, was taken down the river under a galling fire, launched, and could there, under the cover of our artillery and skirmish fire, be used without much exposure in ferrying our troops. This was done with all practicable rapidity, the troops as they crossed forming under the cover of the steep bank to which I have alluded. About an hour before sunset I had succeeded in crossing three (3) regiments of Pettus' brigade, Brigadier-General Pettus in command. The Twentieth Alabama regiment (Colonel I. M. Dedman) of his brigade had previously been sent up the bank of the river to obtain a flanking fire upon the enemy, and the Thirtieth Alabama (Lieutenant-Colonel J. K. Elliott) was retained on the Columbia side to cover the ford in case of any failure. Everything being made ready, I directed General Pettus to advance, and his command dashed forward at the word, driving the enemy before them by a

charge which elicited the warmest admiration of all who witnessed it. Their loss was slight; that of the enemy so considerable that to explain the affair, the commander of the enemy saw fit to attribute to an entire division an attack made by three (3) of its regiments. Having driven the enemy within their main line, General Pettus halted, selected a position to prevent the enemy from interrupting the laying of the pontoons, and was subsequently reinforced by the rest of his brigade and by Holtzelaw's brigade of Clayton's division. The pontoon bridge was then laid with all practicable expedition. During the night General Pettus reported that the enemy was retiring, and he following with his skirmishers. This was as anticipated, and orders had already been given by General Lee to have everything in readiness to move, coupled with the statement that General Hood had advised him that he was between the enemy and Nashville, near Spring Hill. At daybreak I put my division in motion, in rear of Clayton's. Upon arriving at Spring Hill, we were informed that from some cause, which has not been explained, the enemy had been suffered to pass unattacked along the road commanded by the troops which the Commanding General took with him. We were then ordered to push on to Franklin. My division was halted about dusk in three miles of that place, and took no part in the battle. During the night the division was put in position, preparatory to an assault, which it was announced was to be made by the entire army at daybreak. The enemy, however, evacuated the town before the hour for the assault. We then advanced to within a few miles of Nashville, and threw up a line of works—my position being on the right and left of the Franklin pike. Several new lines were built, but my position with regard to the pike remained unchanged.

Until the opening of the battles around Nashville, nothing of interest transpired in my command, except the part taken by my skirmishers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. Bibb, Twenty-third Alabama, in a demonstration made by Lee's corps. The enemy's skirmishers were driven by a greatly inferior force from all of their entrenched positions. My skirmishers were handsomely handled, and did their work with a dash and gallantry which deserve praise. Just before this demonstration, Palmer's brigade (consolidated from Brown's and Reynold's old brigades), was detached and ordered to report to Major-General N. B. Forrest in front of Murfreesboro'. It remained so detached from the division until it reached Bear creak, on this side of Barton's station.

On the 15th of December the battle in front of Nashville opened. Except some unimportant skirmishing, my division took no part in that day's fight; although its position was frequently shifted, and the line greatly attenuated, to fill vacancies in the works caused by the withdrawal of the troops. On the next day the enemy advanced early in heavy force in front of the new line, which we had constructed late the previous night, my division extending its entire length, part of it in two and part in one thin rank, from a short distance to the left of the Franklin pike. The skirmishers of the right of Lee's corps, Clayton's and mine maintained their positions so well, though in small force, that, in their subsequent accounts, the enemy have seen fit to magnify the affair with them into a desperate assault by two corps upon our first line, which was finally successful, but attended with heavy loss. Soon afterward their forces advanced to the assault, principally upon a part of General Clayton's line and upon Pettus' brigade of my division—exposing, in their assault upon Pettus, their flank to a fire from Cumming's brigade. Their success the previous day had emboldened them, and they rushed forward with great spirit, only to be driven back with dreadful slaughter. Finding at last that they could make no impression upon our lines, they relinquished their attempts, and contented themselves with keeping up an incessant fire of small arms at long range, and an artillery fire which I have never seen surpassed for heaviness, continuance and accuracy. This state of things continued until evening—doing, however, but little damage, my men keeping closely in the trenches, and perfectly cool and confident.

Towards evening General Lee sent me information "that things were going badly on the left," and that "it might be necessary to retire under cover of the approaching night." I at once hurried off orders for the artillery horses—which had been removed some distance to the rear to protect them from the fire of the enemy's artillery, under which they could not have lived half an hour—to be brought up. [It is proper to observe that about the middle of the day mist and rain arose, which entirely prevented my seeing anything that was going on beyond my own line.] The messengers had hardly gone for the horses before the break which, commencing some distance beyond the left of Lee's corps, extended to my line. Seeing it, the men on my left commenced leaving the works; but, at the call of their officers, returned at once, and held the line until the enemy were in fifty steps of them on their flank



and pouring a fire into them from the flank and rear. When the true situation of affairs became apparent, and it was evident that the whole army, with the exception of my division and Clayton's, had been broken and scattered, the order for their withdrawal was given—an effort being made to deploy skirmishers from my left brigade, at right angles to the works, to cover in some measure the movement. Amidst the indescribable confusion of other troops, and with the enemy pouring in their fire upon their flank and from the front (having rushed towards the break and then forward, when they perceived that the troops on my left had broken), it was impossible to withdraw the command in order, and it became considerably broken and confused. Many of them were unable to get out of the trenches in time and were captured. All this happened in as short a time as it has taken to describe it. The artillery horses of Rowan's battery on the left of my line could not be brought up in time, and one of the guns of Cuput's battery was lost by being driven at full speed against a tree and the carriage broken. The different brigade and regimental commanders had sent off their horses, there being no protection for them near the breastworks, and being thus unable to move about more rapidly than the men, were prevented from reforming their commands as quickly as could have been desired and extricating them from the throng of panic-stricken stragglers from other commands who crowded the road. This was done at last, and the line of march taken up for Franklin. On the way I received orders from General Lee to leave Pettus' brigade at Hollow Tree Gap, to assist in bringing up the rear, and to proceed with Cumming's brigade and bivouac near the battle-field at Franklin, leaving guards upon the road to stop the stragglers of the army. The next morning, by General Lee's order, I returned with Cumming's brigade to Franklin, and was there joined by General Pettus with his brigade, which had that morning before reaching Franklin captured a stand of colors. Soon after crossing the Harpeth, Lieutenant-General Lee was wounded. When about three miles from Franklin, General Lee moved off with the rest of the corps, and directed me to take command of the cavalry, commanded by Brigadier-General Chalmers, which, with my division, was to constitute the rear-guard.

The enemy did not press us heavily until we arrived near Johnson's house, five or six miles north of Spring Hill. Here I formed my line, having about seven hundred (700) infantry, with the cavalry on my flanks. The enemy advanced rapidly upon me, at-

tacking me in front. I found it impossible to control the cavalry, and, with the exception of a small force on the left, for a short time, to get them into action. I may as well state that at this point, as soon as the enemy engaged us heavily, the cavalry retired in disorder, leaving my small command to their fate. The enemy, perceiving the shortness of my line, at once threw a force around my left-flank, and opened fire upon it and its rear. This was a critical moment, and I felt great anxiety as to its effect upon my men, who, few in numbers, had just had the shameful example of the cavalry added to the terrible trial of the day before. I at once ordered Colonel Watkins to prepare to retire fighting by the flank, and General Pettus to move in line of battle to the rear, with a regiment thrown at right angles to his flank, thus forming three (3) sides of a square. Watkins drove the enemy in his front in confusion, moved at the order which was given on the instant of success by the flank, and charged those on his flank and drove them also.

I halted again in about half a mile, formed a line upon each side of the pike, Pettus on the right, Watkins on the left, each with a regiment formed on his flank perpendicularly to his line to the rear, and having made these dispositions moved again to the rear. The enemy soon enveloped us in front, flanks and rear, but my gallant men, under all their charges, never faltered; never suffered their formation to be broken for an instant, and thus we moved driving our way through them, fighting constantly until within a short distance of Spring Hill, where we found that Major-General Clayton, hearing of our situation, had turned and moved back to our assistance. Here I halted for a time, and Holtzclaw's brigade of Clayton's division was formed upon Watkins' left flank in the manner which I have described. While here the enemy made several attacks, and opened upon us with artillery, but were readily repulsed. This was some time after dark. We finally moved off, and after marching about a mile further, finding that the enemy had evidently become disheartened and abandoned his attacks, I placed the whole command again upon the pike and marched in the ordinary manner until I reached the bivouac of the remainder of the corps.

I desire here to record my acknowledgments to the officers and men of Holtzclaw's brigade, commanded on the occasion by Colonel Jones, for the timely aid which they so gallantly afforded. Lieutenant-General Lee was pleased to acknowledge, in grateful

and complimentary terms, the services of my division upon this occasion, and I make no vain boast when I, too, thank them for their conduct, and declare that never did a command in so perilous a position extricate itself by the force of more admirable coolness, determination and unflinching gallantry.

On that night I was directed by Lieutenant-General Lee to assume command of his corps during his disability.

I am greatly indebted to my staff: Major John J. Reeve, Assistant Adjutant-General; Surgeon H. M. Crompton, Medical Director; Major J. E. McEleath, Assistant Quartermaster; Major J. H. F. Mayo, C. S.; Major H. M. Mathews, Ordnance Officer; Captain G. D. Wise, Assistant Inspector-General; Captain Charles Vidor, Assistant Quartermaster; Lieutenant H. T. Botts, Aid-de-Camp; Lieutenant G. A. Hayard, Aid-de-Camp; also Captain W. H. Sikes, Forty-fifth Tennessee regiment, and Lieutenant W. E. McElwee, Twenty-sixth Tennessee regiment, temporarily on duty at my headquarters, for their most efficient and valuable services, and for their untiring efforts to assist me during this arduous and trying campaign.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

C. L. STEVENSON,  
*Major-General.*

Major J. W. RATCHFORD,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Lee's Corps.*

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**The Peace Commission of 1865.**

By HON. R. M. T. HUNTER.

[We have already published in the *Southern Magazine* a paper from Judge Campbell on the Hampton Roads Conference. The following, from the pen of the distinguished Vice-President of our Society, has recently appeared in the *Philadelphia Weekly Times* as one of their series of "chapters of unwritten history," but our readers will thank us for reproducing it.]

At the beginning of the year 1865, the country had become much exhausted by the exertions and ravages of the war. Scarce a household but had lost some member of its family in the bloody conflicts of the war, to whose chances parents had hitherto consigned the lives of their children without doubt or hesitation. In General Lee's skill and patriotism universal confidence was reposed, and, among many disposed by nature to be sanguine, hopes of final success were still entertained. But among the considerate, and those who had staked and lost both family and fortune in the war, feelings of despondency were beginning to prevail. Particularly was this the case among the older class of legislators. The vacant ranks in our armies were no longer promptly filled, as at the commencement of the war, and an exhibit of our resources, made by Judge Campbell, our Assistant Secretary of War, to General Lee, exhibited only a beggarly account of empty regiments. Propositions to call out boys of not more than sixteen years of age, and to place negroes in the army, were already being discussed. The prospects of success from such expedients were regarded as poor, indeed. The chances for the fall of Fort Fisher seemed imminent, as well as that of the complete closure of the ports through which we had been bringing into the Confederacy food, clothing and munitions of war. These dangers, beginning to be visible, were producing a most depressing effect on our Confederate Congress. When these sources of supply should be cut off, where then would be our resources to prolong the contest? The talk, too, for peace began to be more earnest and open than it had been hitherto. Influential politicians on the other side, formerly of great weight in the party contests of the country, and still bound to leading men of the Confederacy by old associations, were openly exerting themselves for peace, and appealing to men who used to act with and confide in them to unite with and work with them to procure a peace. F. P. Blair, an old Democratic leader during the time of

General Jackson's election to the Presidency and his administration, and, indeed, through the whole period succeeding it up to the election of President Lincoln, adhered to the Government party, and labored earnestly for its success. Finding that things were going much further than he had anticipated, and becoming alarmed for the consequences, he interposed earnestly in the cause of peace, and procured the opportunity to visit Richmond, where he saw many old friends and party associates. Here his representations were not without effect upon his old Confederates who for so long had been in the habit of taking counsel with him on public affairs. He said what seemed to many of us to have much truth, that the disparity of resources was so great in favor of the Federals as would make a much further resistance on the part of the Confederacy impracticable. The United States, he said, if necessary for their purpose, could empty the population of Europe upon the Southern coasts by the offer of the lands of the dispossessed Southern landholders, and they would come in such number that any attempt at resistance would be hopeless. If the resistance, too, were protracted much further, such a temper would be exerted among the adherents of the Government that they would not object to the exchange, but be quite willing for it. Believing this to be the disposition of our opponents, and that a real danger was to be apprehended from a continuance of the war, my own attention was now more seriously directed to peace than heretofore. It turned the thoughts of many Confederates toward peace more seriously than ever before since the commencement of the war. But the very fact of the existence of such disposition on the part of the United States Government, showed how small were the chances for a peaceful and friendly settlement of existing differences between the parties.

THE PEACE COMMISSION APPOINTED.

The talk about peace became so earnest and frequent in the capital of the Confederacy, and the indications of a desire for it among many members of the Confederacy became so plain and obvious, that President Davis and his friends began to feel that it was expedient that the Confederate Government should show some desire for peace on fair terms. To show no sense of responsibility for the terrible conflict then waging, and no desire for peace on any terms, would injure the Confederate Government in the eyes of its own people. The intrinsic difficulties in the way of a fair accommodation were scarcely appreciated, and the desire for change so

universal in the human heart was manifest. Many were alarmed at the talk of conscribing negroes, and mothers, who had shrunk from nothing heretofore, were beginning to flinch at the prospect of seeing their boys of sixteen years of age, or under, exposed to the horrors and hardships such as would then be incurred in military service. Accordingly, the President, in January, 1865, determined to appoint three Commissioners and proposed a conference between them and others to be appointed by the United States Government, on the subject of peace, at some place to be agreed upon between the Governments. The persons appointed were A. H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederate States, Judge John A. Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War, and R. M. T. Hunter, Confederate Senator from the State of Virginia. These were expected to meet President Lincoln and Secretary Seward at Old Point, and prepare for the conference. General Lee was directed to pass the Commissioners through his lines to City Point, from which place it was supposed that General Grant would transfer them to the place of meeting at Old Point. Instructions were delivered to them directing, among other things, that they were to treat on the basis of "two countries," thus precluding any idea of reunion, a provision which subsequently gave rise to difficulties in arranging the meeting, and it was rumored that Mr. Benjamin, Secretary of State, foreseeing this, had endeavored in vain to have it stricken out. We were dispatched at once to Petersburg, and it having gotten out that a Commission of Peace was on its way to Norfolk, we were received everywhere along the line with marks of great interest and curiosity. Of course we did nothing voluntarily to create expectations; and seeing no prospect of negotiating for a settlement of the difficulties between the parties, under our instructions, we did nothing so well calculated to exasperate the difference, as would have been the case had false hopes of peace, wantonly created, been unexpectedly disappointed. But we were not insensible to the manifestations of interest in the question in Petersburg, or that Judge Joynes, on taking leave of us said, as he shook hands, that if we returned with any fair hope of peace, we would be thanked by every man, woman and child in the city.

#### PASSING THROUGH THE LINES.

When we reached Petersburg an intense state of excitement was soon raised in regard to the Commission. This excitement was increased by unexpected delays in passing the Commissioners over

the enemy's line. This delay was the cause of some wonder to ourselves, until, in subsequently passing over, we observed the lean state of General Lee's defences, and how poorly our lines were lined with defenders. The ground between the two armies was covered with spent minnie balls, and it was obvious that if no more carnage had ensued it was not for the want of mutual ill-will and attempts between the combatants. A short time brought us to the river, over which we were conducted to the boat which received us, and subsequently conducted us to the place of meeting. Here we were courteously received by General Grant and his officers, and we had abundant means to compare the resources of the respective and opposing lines. Many of the officers in General Grant's lines loudly expressed their desire for peace, wishes which we did not hesitate to reciprocate. Among them was General Meade, who told us he was near being arrested in Chicago at the commencement of the war for expressing such desires, and the opinion that the contest would result like the Kilkenney cat fight; and who now, said he, will say that such an opinion was absurd? Some of us said he had heard the conjecture that General Lee had already fought as many pitched battles as Napoleon in his Italian campaigns. General Meade said he did not doubt but he had, for many of his skirmishes, as they were called, would have ranked as battles in Napoleon's campaigns. The officers were courteous in their comments on their enemies, and many of them seemed mindful of old acquaintanceship and old ties. But soon General Grant began to receive returns to his telegrams from President Lincoln and Mr. Seward. A copy of our instructions was transmitted to President Lincoln, and now commenced our troubles. The President and his secretary answered promptly that they could not negotiate on the basis of two countries. President Lincoln said he could negotiate on no hypothesis but one of reunion. We were bound by positive instructions on our side, and could make no relaxation of those instructions on that head. As these difficulties seemed to increase by the persistency on both sides, all parties were annoyed by the hitch. Not only General Grant's officers, but we ourselves were anxious to know if there was any chance of settlement and on what terms. It was interesting to us to know whether the other party was aware of our real situation, but nothing occurred to satisfy us on that point; and yet with the system of spies and deserters on both parts, and the notoriety of our state of destitution at home, it seemed impossible to suppose



that the enemy were not sufficiently aware of our condition to make their knowledge in that particular an important element in the negotiation.

THE DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY.

As the difficulties of meeting seemed to increase, the impatience of the bystanders to bring the parties together grew very rapidly. One of General Grant's officers assured us that Mrs. Grant had expressed her opinion openly that her husband ought to send us on, and permit no vital difficulties to break up the interview. She said we were known to be good men, and she believed that our intentions were praiseworthy, and she doubted not but that something good would result if we and Mr. Lincoln could be brought together; but that if Mr. Seward were allowed to intervene between us he would break up all prospect of a settlement of the difficulties by his wily tactics. She seemed to have a poor opinion of his purposes or management. She impressed us very favorably by her frankness and good feelings, but somehow the difficulties were removed, and after a delay of about twenty-four hours, steam was gotten up and we were on our way to the place of meeting. We all moved under some excitement; we were all desirous of a fair settlement, and neither expected nor wished unequal advantages or an unfair adjustment. We were no diplomatists, unused in the practices of negotiation; immense events might be in store for us; great possibilities of change ahead of us, and possibly through us seeds might be sown from which new destinies might spring or changes effected which might alter the course of empire itself. We would probably soon know what would be the effect of our own action or how it would result for our country. These were dreary thoughts to any men, but particularly to those who felt the load of a peculiar responsibility for the turn which events might take. We had formed no particular scheme of negotiation, no definite line of policy by which exciting dispositions on both sides might be molded to satisfactory results. Mr. Stephens seemed possessed with the opinion that secession might be recognized as a conservative remedy by the Northern population, as subsequent conversations proved. He made it evident, too, that he believed the Monroe doctrine might be made the cement of union among our populations. He acted on the principle that by a union to drive the French out of Mexico, our people could be reunited at home. The extent to which he carried these opinions was strange indeed. Judge Campbell seemed to repose his hopes on an armistice to be formed by

General Grant and General Lee, and certain conditions to be declared between them on which this armistice should exist. The intercourse which would subsist during the armistice, it was thought, would hurry about peace and good feeling and the renewal of old habits of communion, and profitable trade would restore good feeling and the old habits of trade, and bring on old feelings generated by the intercourse dictated by self-interest and old association. It was believed, too, that arrangements brought on by General Grant and General Lee to restore old intercourse would be tolerated, which would be rejected if proposed by any one else.

#### THE MEETING.

We met Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward aboard the steamer, and soon the conference was commenced by Mr. Stephens, who seemed impressed with the idea that secession was the true conservative remedy for sectional difference, and appeared to be animated by the hope that he could convince the President and Secretary of the truth of this view. Never was hope more mistaken. Although polite, neither countenanced the idea for a moment. He next proposed another subject upon which he seemed to rely with even more confidence. He revived the old Monroe doctrine, and suggested that a reunion might be formed on the basis of uniting to drive the French out of America, and uniting to organize this continent for Americans. This was received with even less favor than I expected. Both expressed their aversion to any occupancy of Mexico by the French, but if they felt any doubt, expressed none as to the capacity of the United States Government to drive the French away. Mr. Blair, while in Richmond, talked of this as a probable basis of reunion. Mr. Lincoln was evidently afraid that he had uttered sentiments for which he could not be responsible, and earnestly disclaimed having authorized his mission—whether this was true I had my doubts then and now. It is impossible but that Mr. Lincoln must have felt anxiety on the subject of peace. If he knew of our destitution he gave no sign of it, but he did not press the peace as I had supposed he would. He distinctly affirmed that he would not treat except on the basis of reunion and the abolition of slavery. Neither Lincoln nor Seward showed any wise or considerate regard for the whole country, or any desire to make the war as little disastrous to the whole country as possible. If they entertained any such desires they made no exhibition. Their whole object seemed to be to force a reunion

and an abolition of slavery. If this could be done, they seemed to feel little care for the distress and suffering of the beaten party. Mr. Lincoln, it is true, said that a politician on his side had declared that \$400,000,000 ought to be given by way of compensation to the slaveholders, and in this opinion he expressed his concurrence. Upon this Mr. Seward exhibited some impatience and got up to walk across the floor, exclaiming, as he moved, that in his opinion the United States had done enough in expending so much money on the war for the abolition of slavery, and had suffered enough in enduring the losses necessary to carry on the war. "Ah, Mr. Seward," said Mr. Lincoln, "you may talk so about slavery, if you will; but if it was wrong in the South to hold slaves, it was wrong in the North to carry on the slave trade and sell them to the South (as it is notorious that they did, he might have added), and to have held on to the money thus procured without compensation, if the slaves were to be taken by them again." Mr. Lincoln said, however, that he was not authorized to make such a proposition, nor did he make it. It was evident that both the President and Secretary were afraid of the extreme men of their party. Certain objects were to be secured, and when once obtained it was no consideration with their party whether the sufferings of the conquered party were to be mitigated or any relief was to be afforded. And yet to statesmen and benevolent men, it was obvious that both parties were to be benefited by affording the conquered party some relief for their prostration. The reaction of the sufferings of the South upon the North has been obvious enough for many years. The English Government in its scheme of West India emancipation saw the necessity of some relief to all parts of the country. It ought to have been obvious enough to wise and considerate statesmen that some relief was the policy here, too. But the North, when placed in power, seemed to be insensible to these views, and desired to punish those who had been defeated in the contest. To do this they seemed willing to make their losses irretrievable.

#### UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER DEMANDED.

The armistice was promptly opposed by the President and Secretary of State. If the only objects were to re-establish the Union and abolish slavery, they were right. If, however, they had any desire for the general good, and to procure relief for parties suffering, as ought to have been felt by men fit to govern such a country and to understand its wants, their views would have been different.

We had tried to intimate to General Grant before we reached Old Point, that a settlement generally satisfactory to both sides could be more easily effected through him and General Lee by an armistice than in any other way. The attempt was in vain. Lee had too much principle probably to have yielded to such a suggestion, and if Grant would have suffered no principle to restrain him if he had seen his way clear, he had not the ability to weigh truly his responsibility or to understand his opportunities. Generals who are so often accused and blamed for usurping power often see the best way out of difficulties. Had Caesar or Napoleon been in command of the Union forces there is little doubt but that some settlement would have been made to have relieved us of much of our difficulty. When a general knows what to do he is often more reliable than the politicians in civil war. England, probably, was better managed by Cromwell than would have been done by the general voice of her civilians. Politicians often make more fatal inroads on the bulwarks of national liberty than military commanders. It is doubtful whether a Government formed by the Roman Senate would have been better than Scylla's, and Napoleon's constitutions were probably preferable to what the civilians would have given them. Civil wars often produce emergencies which create new and unexpected wants, and in these I have no doubt but that Napoleon was a more reliable counsellor than Lieges. Complications are sometimes produced by the sword that can only be cut by the sword. In this very case some compensation for the negroes taken away would have been both just and politic. Through a truce or armistice it might have been effected, but otherwise it seems not.

With regard to the Monroe doctrine, out of which I feared some complications might arise, as Blair had seemed to favor it very much, I took occasion to say to Mr. Lincoln that I differed much from Mr. Stephens, and so in my opinion did many of our people, who would be found unwilling to kindle a new war with the French on any such pretence. That for one I laid no such claims to the right of exclusive possession of the American continent for the American people, as had been done by others. That many of us would be found unwilling to have a war upon a mere question of policy rather than of honor or right. That although we would hear and communicate whatever was said to us on this question, we were not instructed to treat upon it. Nor for one was I prepared to do so. I asked him, however, to communicate the terms,

if any, upon which he would negotiate with us. He said he could not treat with us with arms in our hands; in rebellion, as it were, against the Government.

THE END OF THE CONFERENCE.

I did not advert to the fact that we were with arms in our hands upon this occasion when we came to treat with him, but I replied this had been often done, especially by Charles I, when at civil war with the British Parliament. He laughed, and said that "Seward could talk with me about Charles I, he only knew that Charles I had lost his head." I said not for that, but because he made no satisfactory settlement at all. But it was of no use to talk with him upon this subject. It was evident that both he and Seward were terribly afraid of their constituents. They would hint at nothing but unconditional submission, although professing to disclaim any such demand. Reunion and submission seemed their sole conditions. Upon the subject of a forfeiture of lands, Mr. Lincoln said it was well known that he was humane and not disposed to exact severe terms. It was then that I expressed myself more freely on the subject of the negotiation and the condition of affairs. It seemed, I said, that nothing was left us but absolute submission both as to rights and property, a wish to impose no unnecessary sacrifice on us as to landed property on the part of one branch of our Government, but no absolute assurance as to this. I might have said it was the expression of an absolute determination not to treat at all, but to demand a submission as absolute as if we were passing through the Candine forks.

Such a rebuke to negotiation after a civil war of half this magnitude in any European nation, probably would have called down the intervention of its neighbors; nor is it probable that the parties to a civil war in any civilized European nation could have met for purposes of adjustment without some plan of relief or amelioration on the part of the stronger in favor of the weaker. Mr. Seward, it is true, disclaimed all demand for unconditional submission. But what else was the demand for reunion and abolition of slavery, without any compensation for negroes or even absolute safety for property proclaimed to have been forfeited?

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**Cavalry Operations in May, 1863—Report of General J. E. B. Stuart.**

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,  
ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,  
May 8th, 1863.

General—In anticipation of the detailed reports, I have the honor to submit the following sketch of the operations of the cavalry immediately preceding and during the battles of the Wilderness and Chancellorsville.

The enemy had more than a week previously concentrated a large body, two or three divisions of cavalry, along the bank of the upper Rappahannock, whose efforts to hold a footing on the south bank had been repulsed with loss by the two brigades with me, commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals Fitzhugh and W. H. F. Lee. Finally, infantry appeared at Kelly's and Rappahannock bridge, but were so inactive that there was nothing inconsistent in the supposition that their appearance was a feint. About dark, however, on Tuesday night (28th), the enemy crossed below the bend of the river at Kelly's, in boats, opposite our videttes, and before the force posted to defend the ford could be sent to the point, had crossed in such numbers as to make an attempt at resistance futile. The party crossing at once threw over a pontoon bridge, and moved directly up the river, compelling our forces to abandon the ford at Kelly's and separating our communication with the lower pickets. General W. H. F. Lee, near Brandy, on receiving this intelligence, sent a regiment (Thirteenth Virginia cavalry) at once to meet the advance of infantry, which was checked a mile above Kelly's. I received information of this move about 9 P. M. at Culpeper, and made arrangements to have the entire cavalry and artillery force in Culpeper on the ground at daylight—directing, in the meantime, the enemy to be so enveloped with pickets as to see what route he took from Kelly's and keep him in check. General W. H. F. Lee selected a fine position between Brandy and Kelly's and awaited the advance; General Fitz. Lee being held in reserve at Brandy, with a regiment at Stevensburg. The enemy did not advance that way seriously, though Chambliss, with the Thirteenth Virginia, was skirmishing all the forenoon with the enemy's infantry.

A Prussian officer of General Carl Schurz's staff was captured, who reported that two corps of the enemy were certainly across the



river: how many more were to follow, he did not know. He estimated the force in this column at 20,000 men. He seemed frank and candid, as well as communicative.

About 1 P. M., I received a report from the pickets towards Madden's that the enemy was moving a large infantry force in that direction. Leaving Chambliss in front of the enemy where I was, I marched the remainder of the command, Fitz. Lee in advance, directly to Madden's, where we pierced the enemy's column while it was marching, and scattered it, taking possession of the road and capturing a number of prisoners, which enabled us to develop their strength and designs, as we captured prisoners from three army corps—Eleventh (Howard's), Twelfth (Slocum's), Fifth (Meade's); and soon after learned that the column had marched direct for Germana ford.

These items were telegraphed to the Commanding General. Colonel J. Lucius Davis, near Beaver Dam, had been telegraphed early that day to move his force at once to occupy and hold the Rapidan fords, but I had no assurance that the order would be obeyed with sufficient promptness to accomplish the object; and as there was no cavalry on the left flank of the main army, it was indispensably necessary to move around, get in front of the enemy moving down upon Fredericksburg, delay him as much as possible, and protect our left flank. Besides, while in the execution of this design, I received instructions from the Commanding General to give necessary orders about public property along the railroad, and swing round to join his left wing, delaying the enemy as much as possible in his march.

The brigade of General Fitz. Lee was put en route, in a jaded and hungry condition, to Raccoon ford, to cross and move round to the enemy's front. General W. H. F. Lee, with the two regiments—Ninth and Thirteenth—under his command, was directed to move by way of Culpeper, to take up the line of the upper Rapidan, and lookout for Gordonsville and the railroad. Couriers had been by directions sent to Eley's and Germana to notify our parties there of the enemy's advance, but were captured and consequently the parties there received no notice; but by the good management of Captain Collins, however, now Major of Fifteenth Virginia cavalry, the enemy was checked for some time at Germana, and his wagons and implements saved, though some of his men were captured. A strong party of sharpshooters was left to hold the road of the enemy's march as long as possible, and then follow us, which was



done till the enemy advanced about eleven at night and compelled them to retire. Dispatches captured showed that trains of wagons and beef cattle accompanied the expedition, and the men were already supplied with five days' rations in haversacks. These items placed it beyond doubt that the enemy were making a real movement to turn Fredericksburg.

Crossing the Rapidan that night, the main body of cavalry was halted for rest a few hours, having marched more than half the night; and one regiment (Colonel Owen's) was sent on to get between the enemy and Fredericksburg and impede his progress. Early next day (Thursday, 30th), Owen, having reached the Germania road on the Fredericksburg side, kept in the enemy's front, while the remainder kept on the enemy's right flank, and opened on his column en route at Wilderness tavern, delaying his march till 12 M., and causing several regiments of infantry to deploy in line of battle to meet us. Hearing that the enemy had already reached Chancellorsville by the Eley's Ford road, I directed my march by Todd's tavern for Spotsylvania Courthouse. Night overtook us at Todd's tavern, and being anxious to know what the Commanding General desired me to do further, I left the command to bivouac here, and proceeded with my staff towards his headquarters near Fredericksburg; but had not proceeded a mile before we found ourselves confronted by a party of the enemy double our own, directly in our path. I sent back hastily for a regiment, which, coming up (Fifth Virginia cavalry, Colonel Tyler), attacked and routed the party. But in the meantime another body of the enemy's cavalry came in rear of the Fifth. Receiving notice of this, I gave orders to withdraw the Fifth from the road, and sent for the brigade to push on at once. This was done, and by the bright moonlight a series of charges routed and scattered this expedition, which had penetrated to within a mile or two of Spotsylvania.

It has been since ascertained that this expedition was by no means an insignificant affair, and, but for the timely arrival of this cavalry on the spot and its prompt and vigorous action, might have resulted disastrously. Artillery as well as trains were passing Spotsylvania, unprotected, at the time. With very little rest, and without waiting for rations or forage, this noble little brigade, under its incomparable leader, was in the saddle early next morning, and moving on Jackson's left flank during the entire day (May 1st), swinging around to the left to threaten the enemy's rear. On

the morning of May 2d, the cavalry of this brigade was disposed so as to clear Jackson's way in turning the enemy's right flank; this was done in the most successful manner, driving off the enemy's cavalry wherever it appeared, and enabled Jackson to surprise the enemy.

In the subsequent operations attending the battle and glorious victory, the cavalry did most essential service in watching our flanks and holding the Eley's Ford road in the enemy's rear, Wickham and Owen being on the extreme right. The horse artillery kept pace, and in the battle of the Wilderness led the attack of artillery.

Too much praise cannot be awarded the brave men who thus bore fatigue, hunger, loss of sleep, and danger without a murmur.

The operations of Brigadier-General W. H. F. Lee, with his handful of men, are embraced in the memoranda furnished by him. His report is not only satisfactory, but gives evidence of sagacity and good conduct throughout, and of great efficiency on the part of his command.

The result shows that the disposition made of these two commands was absolutely necessary. Jones' brigade was entirely out of reach, and Hampton was south of James river recruiting.

That Stoneman with a large cavalry force was allowed to penetrate into the heart of the State, though comparatively harmless in results, is due to the entire inadequacy in numbers of the cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia. The enemy has confronted us with at least three divisions of cavalry, more or less concentrated, which we opposed with one division, spread from the Chesapeake to the Alleghany, yet had not the approach of a battle below made it necessary to divide the force of the two Lee's, I feel very confident it would have been prevented, though with great sacrifice of life, owing to disparity of numbers.

With the Commanding General, who is aware of all the facts, we are content to rest our vindication, if the pursuit of the plain path of duty needs vindication.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

J. E. B. STUART,

*Major-General.*

Brigadier-General R. H. CHILTON,

*A. A. and I. General, Army of Northern Virginia.*

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*Memoranda of the operations of Brigadier-General W. H. F. Lee's command during General Stoneman's raid into Virginia.*

Wednesday, April 29th, 1863—Chambliss' Thirteenth Virginia cavalry, with one piece of artillery, was left at Kelly's; Payne, with one hundred men of Second North Carolina cavalry, had gone to Germana; I, with the Ninth, went to Willis Madden's with General Stuart; left him that night and went to Culpeper Courthouse with the Ninth Virginia cavalry; Chambliss joined me there that night.

Thursday, 30th—Marched from Culpeper to Rapidan station, with Ninth and Thirteenth Virginia cavalry, and one piece of artillery; left one squadron in Culpeper, which fell back before the enemy and joined me at Rapidan; enemy appeared that evening.

Friday, May 1st—Engaged all day with one or two brigades of cavalry; one charge made by Colonel Beale, with one squadron to draw them out; took 30 prisoners, but could not bring them off—was pressed very hard; had orders from General Lee to burn the bridge, and fall back to Gordonsville; burnt the bridge, but held my position all day; enemy commenced moving towards night in force on my left; withdrew at night and marched towards Gordonsville.

Saturday, 2d—Reached Gordonsville at 11 A. M.; heard on my arrival that a large body of the enemy was at Trevilian's depot and Louisa Courthouse; sent the Ninth Virginia in that direction; their videttes were driven in by the enemy; they charged and drove them three miles, killing and wounding a number, and took thirty-two prisoners, one lieutenant; my loss was three or four wounded; four prisoners taken represented three different regiments; went to their assistance with Thirteenth Virginia and two pieces artillery; met Colonel Beale falling back; took a position and waited their approach; they did not advance; learned that General Stoneman with his whole corps was at Louisa Couthouse, moving towards James river; supposed his object was to tear up railroad; they not coming on, my men and horses being worried out by four days' fighting and marching, left out my pickets and withdrew to Gordonsville.

Sunday, 3d—Received information from my scouts that the enemy were leaving Louisa and moving in direction of Columbia; knowing their object was to destroy the aqueduct, I started after them; arrived there at night; heard they had left in a great hurry,

pursued all night; at day-break, having traveled sixty or seventy miles, and the enemy being three hours ahead of me, halted; my videttes reported enemy about one mile in advance; had exchanged words, and they said they belonged to Fifth regulars; knew the party I was pursuing was Wyndham's.

Monday, 4th—Started forward and came upon him drawn up in road; one squadron of Ninth cavalry was ahead, a few hundred yards; charged; enemy charged at same time; fought hand to hand four or five minutes; routed the party; killed six; wounded a number; took thirty-three prisoners, among them Captain Owens and Lieutenant Buford. Captain Owens reported that his regiment was not all present, but that he was on picket; that General Buford was only three miles distant. My horses and men being jaded, and having only about eighth hundred men, I determined not to pursue; continued back to Gordonsville, having traveled seventy or eighty miles.

Tuesday, 5th—Rested, having sent out scouting parties; heard by telegram from Richmond that the enemy were everywhere.

Wednesday, 6th—Having received information that the enemy were recrossing the railroad, moved down upon his left flank; came upon his rear at North Anna river; took seventeen or eighteen prisoners; their rear guard had crossed the river and torn up the bridge. It had been raining all day and river was past fording. Hearing that this was only one party, and that another column was moving lower down, went in that direction; found they had all crossed North Anna river and destroyed bridges behind them. Moved that night in direction of Louisa Courthouse, bivouacked within three miles of Courthouse.

Thursday, 7th—Went to Trevilian's depot; moved at 3 P. M. for Orange Courthouse; scouts reported that enemy had crossed Rapidan.

(Signed)

W. H. F. LEE, *Brigadier-General.*

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**Diary of Captain Robert E. Park, Twelfth Alabama Regiment.**

[Continued from March Number.]

*March 20th, 1865*—I have suffered severely for several days from cold and hoarseness, with an occasional fever, and Dr. Hays, Chief of our Division, advised and obtained an order for my transfer to the hospital. I reluctantly consented to go, for I had a feeling recollection of my unkind treatment in other Yankee prison hospitals, and shrank from a renewal of my very unpleasant acquaintance with them. Thoughts of Knowles of West's Hospital, and of Heger of Point Lookout Hospital, have caused me to dread my treatment at the Fort Delaware Hospital. Growing worse, however, I went, and was registered in ward 11. All of my clothing was taken from me, and I was clad in shirt and drawers of coarse texture, belonging to the hospital, and which had probably been frequently used before by smallpox and other diseased patients. My crutches were also taken from me. "Doctor" Miller, a youth of perhaps twenty years, diagnosed my disease and pronounced it "remittent fever." He prescribed pills. Judging by Miller's manners and appearance, he must be some medical student practicing to gain experience solely, or he has but recently graduated. The accommodations are as good as could be expected in a place conducted without regard to system, and where the patients are under the charge of such young and totally inexperienced physicians. At the head of each bunk or bed a card is suspended against the wall, having on it the name and rank of the patient, character of his disease, and number of his bed. Corn mush, without salt or milk, composed my supper.

*March 21st*—Meals are quite scanty in quantity and uninviting in quality, and the officers from Hilton Head and Fort Pulaski, afflicted with scurvy, are constantly complaining of hunger, and wishing for meal hour to arrive. Mush made of yellow corn meal is the usual supper. The poor fellows suffering from scurvy are a sad sight, as they walk in their hospital garb of shirt and drawers (which are oftentimes either too large and long, or too tight and short for the wearers), from their beds to the stove. Their legs and feet are so drawn as to compel them to walk on tiptoe, their heels being unable to reach the floor. How necessary a few vegetables are to these helpless sufferers. The "best Government the world

ever saw," however, is either too poor or too mean to furnish them.

*March 22d to 24th*—Among others whose beds are near mine are Colonel S. M. Boykin, of the Twentieth South Carolina infantry, a very dignified and intelligent middle aged gentleman from Camden, South Carolina, and Captain James W. McSherry, of Thirty-sixth Virginia infantry, from Martinsburg, Virginia. The latter is a physician of talent and fine standing, but preferred to serve the South as an officer of the line to accepting a place as surgeon. Captain M. is a cousin of my excellent friend Miss Anna L. McSherry, and is a bold and outspoken denouncer of the Yankees. He has scurvy badly. My bed is near the stove, and I have frequent talks with those who come around it to warm themselves, or to interchange opinions about the situation.

*March 25th and 26th*—I find myself much improved, my fevers being slight and rare and hoarseness disappearing. Smallpox, that most loathsome of diseases, has made its appearance in our ward. Colonel Montgomery, of Georgia, was sick with it for several days, with high fever, his face and body being broken out with pimples, but was not removed until several officers, fearing infection, urged his removal from their vicinity to the pest-house. Lieutenant Birkhead, of North Carolina, who lay next to me, showed me his hands, neck and face covered with pimples, yesterday, and asked me what was the matter. I took his hand and wrist in mine, and laughingly pronounced it "smallpox," little dreaming that I was correct. To-day our young doctor decided it was a genuine case of smallpox, and ordered his removal to the smallpox hospital. I never saw nor heard of poor Birkhead again. Deaths from smallpox, pneumonia, scurvy, fevers, dysentery, and various other diseases, are alarmingly frequent. There is honor and glory in death on the field of battle, amid the whistling of bullets, the shrieks of shells, the fierce roar of cannon, and the defiant shouts of the brave combatants, but the saddest, most solemn and painful of deaths is that within prison walls, far from home and loved ones. The picture of his loved home flits across the dying soldier's mind; dear faces seem to look down upon him, but no gentle hands ease his pain, no loving lips whisper words of peace and comfort,—the suffering forms of his sick and wounded comrades are all the friends he sees, their groans all the prayers he hears. As he fights his last fight with the grim monster, no doubt he sees floating aloft the flag he has so often followed—he hears his commander's cheering words urging

his men on to the fray; but they will urge him on no more, and never again will he behold the proud banner he has loved so well. With the roar of the cannon and rattling of musketry falling upon his ear, or with a fair vision of his dear childhood's home before his mind, and a prayer he lisped in days gone by at his mother's knee, his eyes close, his breath ceases, and the brave prisoner's life is ended. Horrid war has given another noble heart to death, and taken the sunshine from another happy home. The dead prisoner is carried to the "dead-house," stripped of his clothing, placed by strangers and enemies in a rough, unpainted pine coffin, hoisted in an old cart, and hurried to the burial ground, like the carcass of some dumb brute, without the presence or ministrations of a single friend. They are carried across the bay, when not sunk within it, and buried on the Jersey shore. The graves are seldomed marked, or it is done in a very careless manner, easily erased in a short time by the action of the elements.

*March 27th*—All the paroled prisoners have had their "checks" redeemed or "cashed," and it is said a boat will carry them to Dixie soon. Oh! that I could be of the lucky number.

*March 28th*—I received a very kind letter from that true friend and noble woman, Miss McSherry, to-day, enclosing \$12, which was paid me in checks. Her generous, disinterested kindness, commands my sincere admiration and warmest gratitude. Miss Mary Alburtis, of Martinsburg, also wrote me very kindly.

*March 29th*—Letters to day from Miss Nena Kiger and Miss Mollie Harlan, and wrote two letters to friends in Winchester, and two to Martinsburg. The only newspaper we are permitted to buy or receive is the "*Philadelphia Inquirer*," a very bitter, boastful and malignant sheet, full of falsehoods about the Southern people and Confederate armies. Its price to our Yankee guards is five cents, to the sick and penniless prisoners is ten cents. A young "galvanized" man—i. e., one ready to take the oath when allowed—named C., who claims to be from both Alabama and Kentucky, is one of the nurses in our ward. He had not the courage, fortitude and patriotic principle requisite to remain true to the land of his birth, and has signified his willingness to repudiate his first pledge, and swear allegiance to the Yankee Government. I have talked with C., and remonstrated with him upon his disgraceful conduct, but he seems resolved upon his course.

*March 30th and 31st*—My first letter from Dixie since my capture, 19th September, over six months ago, came to-day and rejoiced me



greatly. It was from the Hon. David Clopton, member of the Confederate Congress, once a private in my company, and afterwards Quartermaster of the Twelfth Alabama. It was dated Richmond, Virginia, March 6th, and gave me some interesting news. He told me brother James was in Tuskegee when he heard from him last, about the first of February; that General Grimes, of North Carolina, was in command of Rodes' old division, and General Battle was at home on account of his wound. He had not heard of any casualties in my company lately. The letter closed by wishing I might be exchanged soon. Captain Clopton was a member of the United States Congress before the war, and is a leading lawyer of Alabama, as well as an amiable, Christian gentleman and fine scholar.

*April 1st, 1865—Sunday*—Chaplain William. H. Paddock, of the United States army, stationed at Fort Delaware, passed through the ward, and learning that he was a minister, I asked for and was given a Bible, on the inside cover of which was pasted the following printed card, the blanks of which I have filled out:

"BIBLE HOUSE, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND, March, 1865.

"From the Maryland State Bible Society, to Captain Robert E. Park, soldier in company "F," Twelfth regiment, Alabama Volunteers. Should I die on the battle field or in the hospital, for the sake of humanity, acquaint my mother, Mrs. S. T. Park, residing at Greenville, Georgia, of the fact, and where my remains may be found."

Chaplain Paddock seems a very genteel, good man, but his visits to the prisoners must be very rare, as to-day is the first time I have ever seen or heard of him. Perhaps the soldiers of the garrison require all his time and attention. The *Inquirer* gives news of the battle of Fort Steadman, which occurred on the 26th ultimo, and in which that unreliable sheet states that General Gordon made a desperate but unsuccessful attempt to capture the fort, but was repulsed with great loss. Gordon is cautious as well as gallant, and I believe he gained a victory. General Gordon began service as captain of the "Raccoon Roughs," a company in the Sixth Alabama of my brigade, from Jackson county, Alabama, was successively elected major, lieutenant-colonel and colonel, and promoted brigadier-general, major-general, and I hear is now commanding Early's old corps, with the rank of lieutenant-general. In his case, real merit has been promptly and properly rewarded. The confronting lines near Petersburg are stretched out over thirty

miles, and the papers report numerous deserters, who relate doleful tales of scarcity, hardships and despondency within the Confederate lines. How chafing and irritating this protracted confinement in a Yankee bastille is to a Confederate soldier, who sees and keenly feels the great necessity for his presence in the Southern army by the side of his old comrades, now sorely pressed and well nigh overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, and suffering from want of sufficient food and too great loss of sleep and necessary rest. If I could be released from this loathed imprisonment, I would gladly report on my crutches for duty with my company in the trenches around beleaguered Petersburg, the heroic "Cockade City." For, while I could neither charge nor retreat, should either be ordered, yet I could cheer by my words and inspire by my presence those who might be dispirited or despondent.

*April 2d and 3d*—The appalling news of the evacuation of Richmond and Petersburg has reached us, and the Yankee papers are frantic in their exultant rejoicings. We have feared and rather expected this dreaded event, for General Lee's excessive losses from battle, by death and wounds, prisoners, disease and desertion, with no reinforcements whatever, taught us that the evacuation of the gallant Confederate capital was inevitable. I suppose our peerless chieftain will retreat to Lynchburg, or perhaps to North Carolina, and there unite his shattered forces with the army of General Joseph E. Johnston. "There's life in the old land yet," and Lee and Johnston, with their small but veteran armies united, having no longer to guard thousands of miles of frontier, will yet wrest victory and independence for the Confederacy from the immense hosts of Yankees, Germans, Irish, English, Canadians and negroes, ex-slaves, composing the powerful armies under Grant and Sherman. Would that the 7,000 or 8,000 Confederates now confined at Fort Delaware, and their suffering but unconquered comrades at Johnson's Island, Point Lookout, Camp Chase, Camp Douglas, Rock Island, Elmira and other places could join the closely pressed, worn out, starving, but ever faithful and gallant band now retreating and fighting step by step, trusting implicitly in the superb leadership of their idolized commander and his brave lieutenants Longstreet, Ewell, Early, Gordon, Hampton, Pickett and the rest. How quickly the tide of battle would turn, and how speedily glorious victory would again perch upon our banners! It is very hard, bitter, indeed, to endure this cruel, crushing confinement, while our comrades need our aid so greatly. Still I realize the fact

that while painful and harrowing to one's feelings to be pent up within despised prison walls during such trying times, it is no disgrace to be a prisoner of war, if not captured under dishonorable circumstances. Lafayette languished in prison, and so did Louis Napoleon, the present Emperor of France, and his illustrious uncle, the First Napoleon, and so did St. Paul, and so have the great and good of all ages. We are but mortals, and must yield to the fiat of remorseless destiny. There are here many splendid specimens of physical, mental and moral manhood, and in them we see the age of chivalry revived. Three-fourths of the officers are under thirty years of age; many are of the first order of talent, and will make their marks in after life. A large number are graduates of colleges and universities, and many have had the advantage of extensive travel over Europe and America, and are gentlemen of culture and refinement. Some, of course, in so large a body, gathered from so many States, are coarse and unrefined, illiterate men, promoted doubtless on account of their gallantry in battle, or through the partiality of their ignorant companions. A vast majority are brave, gallant and dashing soldiers, and are deserving of special mention in my *Diary*. Superior power has incarcerated these men in a loathsome prison, indignities and insults are daily heaped upon them, and they have no ability to resent them. Starvation sometimes almost drives them to reluctant submission, but the whole Yankee Government, with its immense army of more than a million men, cannot shake their confidence in the truth and justice of their cause, nor crush their resolute, undaunted spirits. For future reference I have bought a small blank book, and am getting the autographs of many acquaintances, with their military rank, name of their commands, and their home address. A great many officers in the pen, and a few in the hospital, have these autograph books, and are assiduous in collecting names.

*April 4th*—Mrs. Emma R. Peterkin, Mrs. Meeteer, and other ladies from Philadelphia, visited the hospital and our ward to-day by special permission. They brought us some vegetables, fruit, etc. Their gentle presence and kindly words of sympathy infused new life into us, and was a most delightful and charming incident in our cheerless prison experience. One of the ladies came to my bed, spoke of her friendship for Mrs. Professor LeConte, of Athens, Georgia, and gave me some nice fruit. She also gave me hastily a recent number of Ben Wood's excellent Democratic paper, the "*New York News*." This is a real treat, as Ben Wood is a "Rebel

sympathizer," and tells the plain truth about the Yankee defeats. His paper is forbidden in prison, lest the prisoners should gather some crumbs of comfort and items of truth from its bold utterances. After reading it, it was passed from couch to couch, and read with great eagerness. These sweet, gentle hearted women, with their winning smiles and cheerful words, proved well springs of joy to us, and brought to mind tender thoughts of our homes and loved ones. Their coming was like a fairy visitation to the sick, wounded and mentally distressed soldiers, lying on their weary couches of pain. May God bless and protect them, and may the noble virtues of these good women be visited in drops of tenderest mercy upon their children, and their children's children, even to the third and fourth generation.

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## Field Letters from Stuart's Headquarters.

[The following autograph letters, for which we are indebted to Major H. B. McClellan, formerly of General J. E. B. Stuart's staff, are worth preserving in our *Papers*, and will be of interest to others as well as to those who "followed the feather" of the gallant and lamented Chief of Cavalry of Army Northern Virginia.]

HEADQUARTERS, CRENSHAW'S FARM, 19th August, 1862.

General J. E. B. STUART, *Commanding Cavalry* :

General—I desire you to rest your men to-day, refresh your horses, prepare rations and everything for the march to-morrow. Get what information you can of fords, roads, and position of enemy, so that your march can be made understandingly and with vigor. I sent to you Captain Mason, an experienced bridge builder, &c., whom I think will be able to aid you in the destruction of the bridges, &c. When that is accomplished, or while in train of execution, as circumstances permit, I wish you to operate back towards Culpeper Courthouse, creating such confusion and consternation as you can, without unnecessarily exposing your men, till you feel Longstreet's right. Take position then on his right, hold yourself in reserve and act as circumstances may require. I wish to know during the day how you proceed in your preparations. They will require the personal attentions of all your officers. The last reports from the signal stations yesterday evening were that the enemy was breaking up his principal encampments, and moving in direction of Culpeper Courthouse.

Very respectfully, &c.,

(Signed)

R. E. LEE, *General*.

Official :

R. CHANNING PRICE, *First Lieutenant and A. D. C.*

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HEADQUARTERS, 19th August, 1862, 4½ P. M.

General J. E. B. STUART, *Commanding Cavalry* :

General—I have just returned from Clarke's mountain. The enemy as far as I can discover is retreating on the road to Fredericksburg. His route is certainly north of Stevensburg, and is thought to be through Brandy station over the Rappahannock by Kelly's ford. You will therefore have to bear well to your right after crossing the Rapidan, unless you can get other information. I propose to start the troops at the rising of the moon to-morrow

morning, which will give the men and horses a little rest, and I believe we shall make more than by starting at night. It is so late now that they could not get off before. The order for to-morrow you will consider modified as above. If you can get information of the route of the enemy, you will endeavor to cut him off; otherwise, make for Kelly's ford over the Rappahannock. Send back all information you can gather. I shall cross at Sommerville ford, and follow in the route of the troops towards Brandy station. If you can get off earlier than the time I have appointed to advantage, do so.

Very respectfully, &c.,

(Signed)

R. E. LEE, *General.*

Official :

R. CHANNING PRICE, *First Lieutenant and A. D. C.*

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Respectfully recommended that Colonel Thomas T. Munford be appointed brigadier-general, and assigned to the command of the brigade now commanded by him as colonel. My reasons for this recommendation are that no colonel in the brigade has been as deserving. He is a gallant soldier, a daring and skilful officer, and is thoroughly identified with the brigade as its leader. As a partisan he has no superior. While others *not* in the brigade might command a higher tribute for ability and military genius, yet when I consider the claims of the Colonel for this promotion, and the gallant service he has rendered, I am constrained to ask that he receive this merited reward. The assignment of a junior to this position would be prejudicial to the best interests of the service.

Most respectfully,

J. E. B. STUART,

*Major-General Commanding Cavalry.*

October 24th, 1862.

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HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,

November 11th, 1862.

General S. COOPER, *Adjutant and Inspector-General C. S. A.:*

General—I have the honor to renew my application for the promotion of Major John Pelham to the rank of lieutenant-colonel of artillery in my division. He will now have five batteries; and always on the battle field, batteries of other divisions and the reserve

are thrown under his command, which make the position he holds one of great responsibility, and it should have corresponding rank.

I will add that Pelham's coolness, courage, ability and judgment, evinced on so many battle fields, vindicate his claims to promotion. So far as service goes he has long since won a colonelcy at the hands of his country. He is a native of Alabama, a graduate at West Point.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. B. STUART, *Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,  
January 31st, 1863.

Major-General J. E. B. STUART, *Commanding Cavalry Division:*

General—I have read with great pleasure the report of Colonel Butler, commanding Second South Carolina cavalry, of the gallant conduct of Sergeant Mickler and his party in the skirmish in the streets of Brentsville, on 9th instant. Colonel Butler says well "that they are entitled to the notice and thanks of their officers and the country." I have forwarded the report to the Secretary of War, with the recommendation that these men be promoted for "gallantry and skill" when the opportunity offers. Should such an opportunity occur, it will give me pleasure to present their names to the Secretary.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, *General.*

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HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS,  
ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 4th, 1864.

[Confidential.]

General—I wish you to bear in mind a few considerations for your government as the commander of the outposts on the lower Rappahannock.

Keep out scouts who will be competent and certain of communicating to you any movement of a large body of infantry (which of course will be preceded by a large force of cavalry), down the Rappahannock on the north side, with the view to a change of base or extension of line to the Acquia railroad. Endeavor to secure accurate information and telegraph it clearly, avoiding the possibility



of ambiguity for which telegrams are noted. It is very important also to state time and place of enemy's movement. Should the enemy endeavor to cross the river anywhere in your front, it is desirable to prevent it, it is possible to delay it, and to the accomplishment of these alternatives, preferably the former, devote every effort, and if needed send for Hart's battery near Milford. Bear in mind that your telegrams may make the whole army strike tents, and night or day, rain or shine, take up the line of march; endeavor therefore to secure *accurate* information.

Should the enemy cross at Eley's or Germana, you should move at once to meet him, feel his force, endeavor to penetrate his designs, and report back by telegram giving his progress, and watch his direction of march, in doing which do not let a feigned movement deceive you. It is probably that a corresponding move will be made by a part or all of our main body, to connect your reconnoissance with which will be highly desirable. The enemy's main body will, in the event of such a move, either march directly for Fredericksburg, or move up the turnpike or plank road towards Vidiersville, as before. In the former case, endeavor to impede his march with artillery and dismounted men, so as to give us a chance to strike his flank. In the latter case, close up and harass his rear, as Rosser did so handsomely before. Above all, *Vigilance*, VIGILANCE, VIGILANCE!

Very respectfully,

J. E. B. STUART, *Major-General*.

Brigadier-General J. R. CHAMBLISS, *Commanding, &c.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,  
23d April, 1864.

Major-General J. E. B. STUART, *Commanding C. C.:*

General—The Commanding General directs me to inform you, that in view of the reports of your scouts and those of General Imboden, he is disposed to believe that Averill contemplates making another expedition either to Staunton or the Virginia and Tennessee railroad simultaneously with the general movement of the Federal army. The reduction of the enemy's force on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, in the lower valley, has induced the General to direct General Imboden, if he finds it practicable, to endeavor to anticipate the movement of Averill, and disconcert his plans by a demonstration against the railroad and the force guarding it in

Martinsburg and the lower valley. Should General Imboden attempt this, General Lee thinks that his end might be promoted by the co-operation of Colonel Mosby, and he directs that you will notify the latter to communicate with General Imboden, and, if possible, arrange some plan for a combined movement. Great care should be taken to prevent your letter to Mosby from falling into the hands of the enemy.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES MARSHALL,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel and A. D. C.*

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**Zagonyi's Charge with Fremont's Body-Guard—A Picturesque Fol-de-rol.**

By Colonel WILLIAM PRESTON JOHNSTON.

In some recent studies on the late civil war, the attention of the writer has directed itself to the amazing exaggeration of certain fighters, and the equally wonderful credulity of certain writers. This was quite notable in the war in Missouri in 1861. The following instance will illustrate this class of cases. Its extreme improbability rests not more upon its explicit denial by the Confederates engaged, than on the internal evidences of inveracity. The writer has no individual interest in the question, except that of historical truth. But if this communication should tend to elicit the exact facts in this case, or to start similar inquiries in other cases, it will do something towards giving a solid basis to our war history, which should not rest upon fiction.

Among the stories that have been repeated until they have acquired currency and are liable to pass into history, unless contradicted, one of the most conspicuous in the Missouri campaign is the myth of "the charge of Zagonyi." Major Zagonyi, a Hungarian, the commander of Fremont's body-guard, gained great credit for the prodigious prowess of his command from his report of a charge in which he led 150 of them against 2,200 Confederates, whom he routed and slaughtered fearfully. His story is told in the Report on the Conduct of the War (part 3, page 186) and is vouched for by General Fremont (*ibid*, page 72); and, altogether, makes a very amusing piece of war literature.

This fierce hussar beholds the enemy in line of battle; he charges down a lane 200 yards, in which forty of his men are unhorsed. He continues thus:

"I formed my command, which at the time was hardly more than 100 men, and with them I attacked the enemy, and in less than five seconds the enemy were completely broken to pieces and running in every direction. My men were so much excited that ten or fifteen of them would attack hundreds of the enemy; and in that single attack, I lost fifteen men killed—that was all I lost in dead; and the enemy's dead men on the ground were 106.

"Question. How did you kill them—with sabres or with revolvers?"

"Answer. Mostly with the sabre. We Hungarians teach our

soldiers never to use the revolver, as they are of very little use. The sabre is the only arm the cavalry need, if they are well drilled. There were no swords of my men that were not bloody; and I saw swords from which the blood was running down on the hand. The men were drilled very well. I had only six weeks from the time I had the first man sworn in service to the time we started for the field; but in those six weeks I brought them forward so far as I ever thought I should be able to do." \* \* \* \*

"By Mr. Chandler—Question. How many did you have wounded besides the fifteen killed?"

"Answer. I had twenty-eight wounded," &c. \* \*

"Question. Do you know the number of the wounded of the enemy?"

"Answer. No, sir; I do not, but I heard that it was a great many; and that a great many of them would die, because they had mostly received heavy cuts on the head. All the dead were cut in the head. Some of the enemy behaved themselves very bravely indeed, but they were not able to hold up against *this tremendous charge*."

Zagonyi says in the course of two pages of testimony: "I found that the enemy, instead of having only 300 or 400, had 1,800 or 1,900." "After the battle was over, I found out there was indeed 2,200." "The probability was that there were 1,900 of the enemy."

In spite of the combined oriental exuberance and suspicious Falstaffian minuteness of this witness, not only less respectable annalists, but the Comte de Paris substantially accepts and adopts his story as a true narrative. The writer is assured, however, by those conversant with the facts, that Zagonyi's rhodomontade was merely the cloak for a disaster. He was ambuscaded by militia, not more numerous than his own command, and severely handled, with the loss of only two or three of his opponents.

If his story, or similar military reports, had been true, it was the wildest extravagance on the part of the United States to keep 60,000 or 80,000 men on foot in Missouri, as was the case at that time. Fremont's body-guard should have been increased to 2,000 or 3,000 men and permitted "to charge with sabres" wherever the Confederates could be found "in line of battle." Instead of this, an ungrateful Republic, while it embalmed these heroes in its history, somewhat contumeliously discharged them from its service. What is the truth of it?

W. P. J.

**The Nation on Our Discussion of the Prison Question.**

Our readers will remember that we devoted the numbers of our PAPERS for March and April of last year (1876) to a discussion of the "*Treatment of Prisoners during the War between the States.*" We sent copies of the numbers containing this discussion to all of the leading newspapers of the country, and wrote them a private letter enclosing proof-sheets of our *summing up*, and asking of them such review as they might think proper. Our Southern papers generally published full and most complimentary notices of the discussion; but the Northern press, so far as we learned, were silent, except a few such ill-natured paragraphs as the one which appeared in the *New York Tribune*, to the effect that the "country wanted peace," and they did not see why *we* could not let it have the peace after which it longed.

Among other papers to which we sent our articles was *The Nation*, from which we hoped to have had a review. It was silent, however, until its issue of April 5th, 1877 (twelve months after our publication), it honors us with a notice which, while ably and very adroitly put, utterly fails, we think, either to fairly represent our argument or to meet the issues involved. At all events, we are willing for our readers to judge between us, and we give herewith in full *The Nation's* review:

**TREATMENT OF PRISONERS IN THE CIVIL WAR.**

The Southern Historical Society has just published the report of its Secretary on the treatment of prisoners by the South in the late war—a subject spoken of by us only a few weeks ago (vol. xxiii, p. 385). The report of such a society is entitled to consideration from its source; but we regret to say that its treatment is not judicial, and that it adds but little to our knowledge of the matter. The evidence of abuses at the largest Southern prisons—Libby, Bell Isle, and especially Andersonville—is so extensive and so excellent (including the statements of both the investigating officers sent by the Confederate Government) that general denials by the author, or persons like General Lee, who do not appear to have had any personal knowledge of the matter, will hardly receive the attention the Secretary seems to expect, particularly as it appears plainly enough from the report that there is only too much foundation for the charges. The author, however, seems to think that any weakness on this point is fully covered if he can show that the North was responsible for the stoppage of exchange and that Southerners suffered in Northern prisons, having the impression,

apparently, that if that were the case no responsibility could afterwards rest on the South; and this seems, curiously enough, to be the position of nearly all the Southern writers who have referred to the matter. Instead of frankly acknowledging and regretting these wrongs, they defend them. Extraordinary as it may seem, this Historical Society justifies the preparations made to blow up the thousand and odd Union officers in the Libby prison at the time when the near approach of Dahlgren threatened Richmond; and no doubt the order of Winder at Andersonville to the same effect appears to these Southern historians in the same light.

After this our readers will not be much surprise to learn that Winder was a gallant hero and Wirz a saintly martyr, though the immediate responsibility for the fearful mortality rests upon them beyond a question. It appears plainly enough from this report that the mortality at Andersonville was almost wholly from diarrhoea, dysentery, gangrene, scurvy, and allied diseases, produced principally by overcrowding, filth, exposure, bad water, and insufficient food, and that all of these, except possibly the last, were easily remediable. There was an abundance of land and timber for extending the limits of the prison, crowded with more than four times the number it could healthily hold. Shelter there was none. Colonel Persons, during the brief period of his command at the first opening of the prison in the spring of 1864, collected lumber for barracks, but General Winder refused to use it, and compelled even the sick in hospital to lie on the ground in such a state that the Confederate surgeons on duty reported that the condition of the hospital "was horrible." This refusal to provide shelter was as unnecessary as the overcrowding. When, on the death of General Winder in the spring of 1865, General Imboden took command, he seems to have had no trouble in erecting dwellings for 1,200 or 1,500 men within a fortnight by the labor of the prisoners, and he mentions the want of shelter as one of the principal causes of the death-rate of the previous year. Here again we find it difficult to put ourselves in the position of an historian who thinks that this refusal of General Winder and Lieutenant Wirz to furnish shelter was justified by an attempt to escape made by one of the first parties allowed to go outside the stockade months before. Yet this is seriously said of a prison where in five months about ten thousand men died in an average of less than twenty thousand confined, and in October the deaths were one-fourth of the average number there (1,560 in average 6,200). The drainage and water-supply stand in the same position. Both were foul, when they might easily have been fine. These things were so needless and so fatal that we can well believe Colonel Chandler, who reported officially to the Confederate Government, at the time when men were dying at the rate of over one hundred a day, that General Winder advocated "deliberately and in cold blood the propriety of leaving them in their present condition until their number had been sufficiently reduced by death to make the

present arrangement suffice for their accommodation." With such an object before him, there is little reason to doubt the evidence of the bad quality and the insufficient amount of food furnished. The Secretary, in his report, quotes three witnesses (Frost, Jones and Park), to the effect that the same rations were issued to the guard—a disputed point not perhaps very important to settle, as it is not denied that there were abundant supplies at Americus and elsewhere in the vicinity, in a region which Sherman found so well supplied, and that our men were starving to death on the rations of unbolted corn-meal alone that were issued to them, while the gifts of charitable neighbors were not allowed to be distributed to them.

The responsibility of General Winder and Lieutenant Wirz for all this cannot be rationally denied; but we could wish for our national credit that it went no further. Unfortunately, the injudicious authors of this report will not allow us to believe so. Early in 1864, soon after the general reduction in rations to the prisoners of war in the hands of the Confederates, attention was drawn to their sufferings. Colonel Persons appealed to the courts for an injunction on the Andersonville prison as a public nuisance. Hon. H. S. Foote, aroused by the Secretary of War's recommendation that no more meat be issued to the prisoners, called the attention of the Confederate House of Representatives to their sufferings, and asked investigation. General Howell Cobb, who had command of the department, investigated the hospitals, and, in the face of outspoken reports from the surgeons in charge, reported that action was not required. Dr. Jones, however, who was specially sent there by the Government for scientific investigation, made a report which, though one-sided and long-winded, showed plainly enough the state of things. Colonel Chandler, who was sent by the Secretary of War, Colonel Seddon, to investigate the charges, briefly reported in August, 1864, that it was "a place the horrors which it is difficult to describe, and which is a disgrace to civilization," and recommended the removal of General Winder. General Cooper, the Inspector-General, endorsed this report, writing that "Andersonville is a reproach to us as a nation." J. A. Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of War, urgently endorsed the report. General Bragg and General Ransom and others agitated for Winder's removal. Judge Ould made the mortality of the prisoners the ground for a strong appeal to the United States for a renewal of exchange. *And this was all.* Mr. Davis not only refused to remove General Winder, but extended his authority to all the Confederate prisons, which powers he held until his death in the following year. The apologists for President Davis have always contended that he was not aware of the "horror"; and singular as it may seem that a ruler who always made himself personally familiar with even the details of the War Office, should not have known of an investigation of such a nature, made in consequence of action of the House, pressed by the principal departments, and made the basis



of diplomatic action with the United States, the wrong was so great that we hesitated to believe that Mr. Davis could sanction or defend it. But it appears from this report that Mr. Davis knew General Winder's character, and—we quote his own words in his letter of June 20, 1867—"was *always*, therefore, confident that the charge was unjustly imputed" and that everything was done that could have been expected. We must confess to a feeling of regret that an injudicious advocate has thought it necessary to publish a letter that shows the man whom half of our nation for years delighted to honor, as always knowing the charges and defending the course pursued.

The Secretary expends a considerable space upon stories of wrongs by Northern soldiers, most of which are probably true, but it is hardly worth while to analyze in detail the confused assemblage. Many of the incidents were the unavoidable atrocities of border warfare, not connected with the prisons discussed, and most of the others were exceptional, occurring under officers who were speedily removed, or under unusual circumstances, as appears by the accounts of others in the same report, showing a generally different state of affairs. That sad abuses occurred occasionally is evident enough, but that there was any general ill-treatment for which the Government was responsible there is no reason to believe, except certain suspicious statistics of prison mortality made up from statements of Secretary Stanton as to the number of prisoners taken, and a report of Surgeon Barnes giving the total number of deaths. The result of the calculation is startling, for it shows a rate of mortality in the Confederate prisons, excluding Andersonville, only about one-half of that in the Northern. Bearing in mind the great sacrifice of life at Belle Isle and Libby, and the loose way in which the estimate is made from diverse and inaccessible sources, it seems suspicious in the extreme. It has been impossible to learn anything about it from the present Adjutant-General's office, where the applicant will find himself turned off with some ambiguous statement that the mortality on one side is roughly estimated at 12 per cent., and on the other side at 16 per cent.; and if he asks on which side it was twelve and which sixteen, he refused further information on the ground that to answer such requests "would require the entire clerical force of the office for about three years." It is to be hoped that under the new Administration this stain on the national honor may be removed. But meanwhile our reputation suffers most seriously from the charge, as any one who remembers the flings of foreign journals will recall with mortification.

Now we respectfully ask any one interested in the matter to read what we published on this question, and we feel entirely confident that any fair-minded man will agree with us that the above notice of *The Nation* is an unfair representation of both our argument and the spirit in which we wrote. Our discussion was not a "re-

port on the treatment of prisoners by the South in the late war," else it might have assumed a different form, and perhaps have been more "judicial." But the slanders against the South, which had gone so long unanswered that they had "run riot over both facts and probabilities," were repeated on the floor of the House of Representatives by Mr. Blaine, who charged that "*Mr. Davis was the author, knowingly, deliberately, guiltily and wilfully, of the gigantic murder and crime at Andersonville.*" We felt called on to defend our Government from these charges, and our argument was *not* that there were no "abuses" in Southern prisons—that there was no evidence of cruelty to prisoners on the part of individuals, and by no means that there were not great sufferings and fearful mortality among the Federal prisoners at the South; but we pursued a line of argument clearly indicated in the following brief *summing up*, with which we closed our discussion, and which, we respectfully submit, *The Nation* might have given to its readers, if it had been itself disposed to be "*judicial*" in its treatment of this question. We closed our discussion as follows:

We think that we have established the following points:

1. The laws of the Confederate Congress, the orders of the War Department, the regulations of the Surgeon-General, the action of our Generals in the field, and the orders of those who had the immediate charge of the prisoners, all provided that prisoners in the hands of the Confederates should be kindly treated, supplied with the same rations which our soldiers had, and cared for when sick in hospitals placed on *precisely the same footing as the hospitals for Confederate soldiers.*

2. If these regulations were violated in individual instances, and if subordinates were sometimes cruel to prisoners, it was without the knowledge or consent of the Confederate Government, which always took prompt action on any case reported to them.

3. If the prisoners failed to get their full rations, and had those of inferior quality, the Confederate soldiers suffered in precisely the same way, and to the same extent, and it resulted from that system of warfare adopted by the Federal authorities, which carried desolation and ruin to every part of the South they could reach, and which in starving the Confederates into submission brought the same evils upon their own men in Southern prisons.

4. The mortality in Southern prisons (fearfully large, although *over three per cent. less than the mortality in Northern prisons*), resulted from causes beyond the control of our authorities—from epidemics, &c., which might have been avoided, or greatly mitigated, had not the Federal Government declared medicines "*contraband of war*"—refused the proposition of Judge Ould, that each Government should send its own surgeons with medicines, hospital stores, &c.,

to minister to soldiers in prison—declined his proposition to send medicines to its own men in Southern prisons, without being required to allow the Confederates the same privilege—refused to allow the Confederate Government to buy medicines for gold, tobacco or cotton, which it offered to pledge its honor should be used only for Federal prisoners in its hands—refused to exchange sick and wounded—and neglected from August to December, 1864, to accede to Judge Ould's proposition to send transportation to Savannah and receive *without equivalent* from ten to fifteen thousand Federal prisoners, notwithstanding the fact that this offer was accompanied with a statement of the utter inability of the Confederacy to provide for these prisoners, and a detailed report of the monthly mortality at Andersonville, and that Judge Ould, again and again, urged compliance with his humane proposal.

5. We have proven, by the most unimpeachable testimony, that the sufferings of Confederate prisoners in Northern "prison pens," were terrible beyond description—that they were starved in a land of plenty—that they were frozen where fuel and clothing were abundant—that they suffered untold horrors for want of medicines, hospital stores and proper medical attention—that they were shot by sentinels, beaten by officers, and subjected to the most cruel punishments upon the slightest pretexts—that friends at the North were refused the privilege of clothing their nakedness or feeding them when starving—and that these outrages were perpetrated not only with the full knowledge of, but under the orders of E. M. STANTON, U. S. SECRETARY OF WAR. We have proven these things by Federal as well as Confederate testimony.

6. We have shown that all the suffering of prisoners on both sides could have been avoided by simply carrying out the terms of the cartel, and that for the failure to do this the *Federal authorities alone* were responsible; that the Confederate Government originally proposed the cartel, and were always ready to carry it out in both letter and spirit; that the Federal authorities observed its terms only so long as it was to their interest to do so, and then repudiated their plighted faith, and proposed other terms, which were greatly to the disadvantage of the Confederates; that when the Government at Richmond agreed to accept the hard terms of exchange offered them, these were at once repudiated by the Federal authorities; that when Judge Ould agreed upon a new cartel with General Butler, Lieutenant-General Grant refused to approve it, and Mr. Stanton repudiated it; and that the policy of the Federal Government was to refuse all exchanges, while they "fired the Northern heart" by placing the whole blame upon the "Rebels," and by circulating the most heartrending stories of "Rebel barbarity" to prisoners.

If either of the above points has not been made clear to any sincere seeker after the truth, we would be most happy to produce further testimony. And we hold ourselves prepared to maintain, against all comers, *the truth of every proposition we have laid down in*

*this discussion.* Let the calm verdict of history decide between the Confederate Government and their calumniators.

We regret that *The Nation* did not attempt to meet these points fairly and squarely, instead of seeking to break their force by an ingenious (though we are willing to hope unintentional) misrepresentation of what we wrote.

But as it has not thought proper to pursue this course, let us briefly examine some of the points in its review. The sneer at the testimony of "persons like General Lee, who do not appear to have had any personal knowledge of the matter," shows an utter misapprehension of the object for which we introduced such testimony.

We gave the statements of ex-President Davis, General R. E. Lee, Vice-President A. H. Stephens, and others high in authority among the Confederates, not to show that there was not suffering among the prisoners, but to show that the Confederate Government *always ordered* that the prisoners should be kindly treated, and that they sought to have these kind intentions carried out.

We did *not* attempt to justify cruel treatment to Federal prisoners on the ground "that the North was responsible for the stoppage of exchange, and that Southerners suffered in Northern prisons." We might not have introduced the treatment of Confederates in Northern prisons at all, in this discussion, but for the fact that Mr. Blaine (to whom we were replying) threw down the gauntlet, and declared that there was no cruel treatment of Confederate prisoners at the North—indeed, that they were much better cared for than when in the Confederacy—and we felt called on, therefore, to show that the Federal authorities were themselves guilty of the atrocities which they (falsely) charged against the Confederates.

The statement that "this Historical Society justifies the preparations made to blow up the thousand and odd Union officers in the Libby Prison at the time when the near approach of Dahlgren threatened Richmond," is not capable of even a fair *inference* from anything which we wrote. We simply published in full, without note or comment, the report of the committee of the Confederate Congress, presented March 3d, 1865, in which they give the circumstances under which the authorities of Libby Prison acted (Dahlgren approaching Richmond for the avowed purpose of liberating over 5,000 prisoners and sacking the city, after murdering the

Confederate President, Cabinet, &c.) If *The Nation* desires to discuss that question, we presume it could be accomodated, but we expressed *absolutely no opinion whatever on it*. Nor did we intimate the opinion that "*Wirz was a saintly martyr*." We simply showed that the charges against him were not proven—that his so-called "trial" was the veriest mockery of justice—that much of the testimony against him was afterwards proven to be perjured—and that the witnesses for the defence were summarily dismissed (without being heard) *by the prosecution*. Nor did we deem it incumbent upon us to enter into any defence of General Winder, distinctly averring that "if it could be proven beyond all doubt that the officers at Andersonville were the fiends incarnate that Northern hatred pictures them to be, there is not one scintilla of proof that the Government at Richmond ordered, approved or in any way countenanced their atrocities." But we did publish incidentally letters from Secretary Seddon, ex-President Davis, Adjutant-General S. Cooper, Colonel George W. Brent and General G. T. Beauregard, and the testimony of Federal prisoners themselves, going to show that the charges against him were false.

*The Nation* then proceeds to ring the same old charges on the horrors of Andersonville which we have heard for years, and utterly ignores the testimony which we introduced on the other side. We gave the statements of Mr. L. M. Park, of La Grange, Georgia (for whom we vouched as a gentleman of unimpeachable character), who was on duty at Andersonville nearly the whole of the time it was a prison, and who gives the most emphatic testimony to the effect that the water used by the prisoners was the same as that used by the guards, and was not "foul," as has been represented—that the failure to erect barracks was from want of mills to saw the lumber, want of timber, and lack of even a supply of nails—that the rations issued to the prisoners were precisely the same as those issued to the guard—that the mortality among the guard was as great, in proportion to numbers, as among the prisoners—and that the causes of the mortality were utterly beyond the control of the Confederate authorities.

We published also an able and exhaustive paper from Dr. Joseph Jones, of New Orleans (a gentleman who stands in the very front rank of his profession), who offically investigated and reported on the causes of mortality at Andersonville, and who, while admitting and deploring the fearful death rate, fully exonerates the Confederate authorities from blame in the matter. We also gave a number

of orders, letters, &c., from the Confederate authorities, showing that they were doing all in their power to mitigate the sufferings of the prisoners, and the emphatic testimony of Dr. Randolph Stevenson, the surgeon in charge of the hospital, to the following effect:

"The guards on duty here were similarly affected with gangrene and scurvy. Captain Wirz had gangrene in an old wound, which he had received in the battle of Manassas, in 1861, and was absent from the post (Andersonville) some four weeks on surgeon's certificate. (*In his trial certain Federal witnesses swore to his killing certain prisoners in August, 1864, when he (Wirz) was actually at that time absent on sick leave in Augusta, Georgia.*) General Winder had gangrene of the face, and was forbidden by his surgeon (I. H. White) to go inside the stockade. Colonel G. C. Gibbs, commandant of the post, had gangrene of the face, and was furloughed under the certificate of Surgeons Wible and Gore, of Americus, Georgia. The writer of this can fully attest to effects of gangrene and scurvy contracted whilst on duty there; their marks will follow him to his grave. The Confederate graveyard at Andersonville will fully prove that the mortality among the guards was almost as great in proportion to the number of men as among the Federals."

The paper of General Imboden, which we published, fully corroborates the above statements.

But we gave the testimony of Mr. John M. Frost, of the Nineteenth Maine regiment, the resolutions of the Andersonville prisoners adopted September 23d, 1864, the testimony of Prescott Tracy, of the Eighty-second regiment, New York volunteers, and of another Andersonville prisoner—all going to establish in the most emphatic manner the points we made. *The Nation* ignores most of this testimony, and uses what it alludes to very much as Judge Advocate Chipman did Dr. Jones' report in the Wirz trial—*i. e.*, uses it to prove that great suffering and mortality existed at Andersonville, but suppresses the part which exonerates the Confederate authorities from the charges made against them.

Even at the risk of wearying our readers, we must (for the benefit of those who have not seen our previous papers on this subject), repeat our comments on the testimony we introduced:

It appears, then, from the foregoing statements that the prison at Andersonville was established with a view to healthfulness of location, and that the great mortality which ensued resulted chiefly from the crowded condition of the stockade, the use of corn bread, to which the prisoners had not been accustomed, the want of variety in the rations furnished, and the want of medicines and hos-



pital stores to enable our surgeons properly to treat the sick. As to the first point, the reply is at hand. The stockade at Andersonville was originally designed for a much smaller number of prisoners than were afterwards crowded into it. But prisoners accumulated—after the stoppage of exchange—in Richmond and at other points; the Dahlgren raid—which had for its avowed object the liberation of the prisoners, the assassination of President Davis and his Cabinet, and the sacking of Richmond—warned our authorities against allowing large numbers of prisoners to remain in Richmond, even if the difficulty of feeding them there was removed; and the only alternative was to rush them down to Andersonville, as enough men to guard them elsewhere could not be spared from the ranks of our armies, which were now everywhere fighting overwhelming odds. We have a statement from an entirely trustworthy source that the reason prisoners were not detailed to cut timber with which to enlarge the stockade and build shelters is, that this privilege *was* granted to a large number of them when the prison was first established, they giving their parole of honor not to attempt to escape; and that they *violated their paroles, threw away their axes, and spread dismay throughout that whole region by creating the impression that all of the prisoners had broken loose.* This experiment could not, of course, be repeated, and the rest had to suffer for the bad faith of these, who not only prevented the detail of any numbers of other prisoners for this work, but made way with axes which could not be replaced. In reference to feeding the prisoners on corn bread, there has been the loudest complaints and the bitterest denunciations. They had not been accustomed to such hard fare as “hog and hominy,” and the poor fellows did suffer fearfully from it. *But the Confederate soldiers had the same rations.* Our soldiers had the advantage of buying supplies and of receiving occasional boxes from home, which the prisoners at Andersonville could have enjoyed to an even greater extent had the United States authorities been willing to accept the humane proposition of our Commissioner of Exchange—to allow each side to send supplies to their prisoners. But why did not the Confederacy furnish better rations to both our own soldiers and our prisoners? and why were the prisoners at Andersonville not supplied with *wheat* bread instead of *corn* bread? Answers to these questions may be abundantly found by referring to the orders of Major-General John Pope, directing his men “to live on the country”; the orders of General Sherman, in fulfilling his avowed purpose to “make Georgia howl” as he “smashed things generally” in that “great march,” which left smoking, blackened ruins and desolated fields to mark his progress; the orders of General Grant to his Lieutenant, to desolate the rich wheat-growing Valley of Virginia; or the reports of General Sheridan, boasting of the number of barns he had burned, the mills he had destroyed, and the large amount of wheat he had given to the flames, until there was really more truth than poetry in his boast that he had made the Shenandoah Valley “such a



waste that even a crow flying over would be compelled to carry his own rations." We have these and other similar orders of Federal Generals in our archives (we propose to give hereafter a few choice extracts from them), and we respectfully submit that, for the South to be abused for not furnishing Federal prisoners with better rations, when our own soldiers and people had been brought painfully near the starvation point by the mode of warfare which the Federal Government adopted, is even more unreasonable than the course of the old Egyptian task-masters who required their captives to "make brick without straw." And to the complaints that the sick did not have proper medical attention, we reply that the hospital at Andersonville was placed on *precisely the same footing as the hospitals for the treatment of our own soldiers*. We have the law of the Confederate Congress enjoining this, and the orders of the Surgeon-General enforcing it. Besides, we have in our archives a large budget of original orders, telegrams, letters, &c., which passed between the officers on duty at Andersonville and their superiors. We have carefully looked through this large mass of papers, and we have been unable to discover a *single sentence* indicating that the prisoners were to be treated otherwise than kindly, or that the hospital was to receive a smaller supply of medicines or of stores than the hospitals for Confederate soldiers. On the contrary, the whole of these papers go to show that the prison hospital at Andersonville was *on the same footing precisely* with every hospital for sick and wounded Confederates, and that the scarcity of medicines and hospital stores, of which there was such constant complaint, proceeded from causes which our authorities could not control.

But we can make the case still stronger. Whose fault was it that the Confederacy was utterly unable to supply medicines for the hospitals of either friends or foe? Most unquestionably the responsibility rests with the Federal authorities. They not only declared medicines "contraband of war"—even arresting ladies coming South for concealing a little quinine under their skirts—but they sanctioned the custom of their soldiers to sack every drug store in the Confederacy which they could reach, and to destroy even the little stock of medicines which the private physician might chance to have on hand.

When General Milroy banished from Winchester, Virginia, the family of Mr. Loyd Logan, because the General (and his wife) fancied his elegantly furnished mansion for headquarters, he not only forbade their carrying with them a change of raiment, and refused to allow Mrs. Logan to take one of her spoons with which to administer medicine to a sick child, but he *most emphatically prohibited their carrying a small medicine chest, or even a few phials of medicine which the physician had prescribed for immediate use*. Possibly some ingenious casuist may defend this policy; but who will defend at the bar of history the refusal of the Federal authorities to accept Judge Ould's several propositions to allow surgeons from either side to visit and minister to their own men in prison—to

allow each to furnish medicines, &c., to their prisoners in the hands of the other—and finally to purchase in the North, for gold, cotton, or tobacco, medicines for the exclusive use of Federal prisoners in the South? Well might General Lee have said to President Davis, in response to expressions of bitter disappointment when he reported the failure of his efforts to bring about an exchange of prisoners: "*We have done everything in our power to mitigate the suffering of prisoners, and there is no just cause for a sense of further responsibility on our part.*"

*The Nation* says: "We find it difficult to put ourselves in the position of an historian who thinks that this refusal of General Winder and Lieutenant Wirz to furnish shelter was justified by an attempt to escape made by one of the first parties allowed to go outside the stockade months before." Now this, as the reader can readily see by glancing at the sentence, is very different from what we wrote. We did not justify "*a refusal of General Winder and Lieutenant Wirz to furnish shelter*" (on the contrary, if these "judicial" gentlemen of *The Nation* will stop their bald assertions and prove that there was such a "*refusal*," we will join them in strong condemnation of it), but we cited this incident to account for the fact that *details of prisoners* were not made for the purpose for some time after the first parties violated their paroles and threw away implements which could not be replaced. That these details were made afterwards, our testimony abundantly shows.

We might have mentioned several other reasons for the delay in providing more comfortable quarters for the prisoners at Andersonville: 1. It was always expected to very greatly reduce the number by the establishment of other prisons which were being prepared as rapidly as the means at hand would allow. 2. It was hoped that the United States authorities would surely consent to an exchange of prisoners when the Confederates agreed to their own hard terms, which Judge Ould had finally done. 3. And when our Commissioner proposed in August, 1864, to deliver at Savannah from ten to fifteen thousand prisoners which the Federal authorities might *have without equivalent* by simply sending transportation for them, it was reasonably supposed that Andersonville would be *at once* relieved of its over-crowding, for it was not anticipated that the United States Government would be guilty of the crime of allowing its brave soldiers to languish, suffer and die *from August until December* when "the Rebels" opened the doors of the prison and bade them go without conditions. 4. We ought to have brought out more clearly in our discussion the bearings of the

*difficulties of transportation* which the Confederates encountered the last year of the war, upon this question of properly providing for their prisoners. Any one who will even glance through the papers on the "Resources of the Confederacy" which we have published, will see how the breaking down of the railroads and the utter inadequacy of transportation put our armies on starvation rations even when there were enough in the depots to supply them; and, of course, the supplies for the prisoners were cut down in the same way.

But we might safely rest this whole question of the relative treatment of prisoners North and South on the official figures of Secretary Stanton and Surgeon-General Barnes, which were thus presented by Hon. B. H. Hill in his masterly reply to Mr. Blaine:

"Now, will the gentleman believe testimony from the dead? The Bible says, 'The tree is known by its fruits.' And, after all, what is the test of suffering of these prisoners North and South? The test is the result. Now, I call the attention of gentlemen to this fact, that the report of Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War—you will believe him, will you not?—on the 19th July, 1866—send to the Library and get it—exhibits the fact that of the Federal prisoners in Confederate hands during the war, only 22,576 died, while of the Confederate prisoners in Federal hands 26,436 died. And Surgeon-General Barnes reports in an official report—I suppose you will believe him—that in round numbers the Confederate prisoners in Federal hands amounted to 220,000, while the Federal prisoners in Confederate hands amounted to 270,000. Out of the 270,000 in Confederate hands 22,000 died, while of the 220,000 Confederates in Federal hands over 26,000 died. The ratio is this: more than twelve per cent. of the Confederates in Federal hands died, and less than nine per cent. of the Federals in Confederate hands died. What is the logic of these facts according to the gentleman from Maine? I scorn to charge murder upon the officials of Northern prisons, as the gentleman has done upon Confederate prison officials. I labor to demonstrate that such miseries are inevitable in prison life, no matter how humane the regulations."

These figures (compiled not by Confederates, but by those who had no love for "Rebels"—compiled from documents to which *we* are denied all access—compiled in the regular course of official duty, and with scarcely a thought of the tale they would tell when collated and compared) are an end to the controversy so far as showing that *if the Confederates were cruel to prisoners, it does not lie in the mouths of the United States authorities, or their apologists, to condemn them.* Let them first purge themselves of the charge before they try

to blacken the Confederacy with it. No wonder that attempts have been made to explain away these figures, and even to deny their authenticity—one bold man charging that “Jeff. Davis manufactured them for Ben. Hill’s use”; but all such attempts have proven ludicrous failures.

Mr. Blaine, with full time to prepare his reply and all of the reports at hand, did not dare to deny their authenticity, but only endeavored to break their force by the following lame explanation:

“Now, in regard to the relative number of prisoners that died in the North and the South respectively, the gentleman undertook to show that a great many more prisoners died in the hands of the Union authorities than in the hands of the Rebels. I have had conversations with surgeons of the army about that, and they say that there were a large number of deaths of Rebel prisoners, but that during the latter period of the war they came into our hands very much exhausted, ill-clad, ill-fed, diseased, so that they died in our prisons of diseases that they brought with them. And one eminent surgeon said, without wishing at all to be quoted in this debate, that the question was not only what was the condition of the prisoners when they came to us, but what it was when they were sent back. Our men were taken in full health and strength; they came back wasted and worn—mere skeletons. The Rebel prisoners, in large numbers, were, when taken, emaciated and reduced; and General Grant says that at the time such superhuman efforts were made for exchange there were 90,000 men that would have reinforced the Confederate armies the next day, prisoners in our hands who were in good health and ready for fight. This consideration sheds a great deal of light on what the gentleman states.”

This explanation (?) cuts the throat of the whole argument to prove Confederate cruelty to prisoners, for if the Confederacy could make no better provision for its own soldiers in the field, how could it be expected to provide for its prisoners? And it is, at the same time, a very severe reflection upon the “patriot soldiers” of the North who (though hale, hearty, well equipped and well fed) not unfrequently found greatly inferior numbers of these “emaciated and reduced” skeletons more than a match for their valor.

But *The Nation* evidently sees the force of these figures, and makes an attempt to break it, which is certainly adroit, whatever we may think of its candor. It says:

That sad abuses occurred occasionally is evident enough, but that there was any general ill-treatment for which the Government was responsible there is no reason to believe except certain suspicious statistics of prison mortality made up from statements of

Secretary Stanton as to the number of prisoners taken, and a report of Surgeon Barnes giving the total number of deaths. The result of the calculation is startling, for it shows a rate of mortality in the Confederate prisons, excluding Andersonville, only about one-half of that in the Northern. Bearing in mind the great sacrifice of life at Belle Isle and Libby, and the loose way in which the estimate is made from diverse and inaccessible sources, it seems suspicious in the extreme. It has been impossible to learn anything about it from the present Adjutant-General's office, where the applicant will find himself turned off with some ambiguous statement that the mortality on one side is roughly estimated at 12 per cent. and on the other side at 16 per cent.; and if he asks on which side it was twelve and which sixteen, he refused further information on the ground that to answer such requests "would require the entire clerical force of the office for about three years." It is to be hoped that under the new Administration this stain on the national honor may be removed. But meanwhile our reputation suffers most seriously from the charge, as any one who remembers the flings of foreign journals will recall with mortification."

Now, we tell *The Nation*, in all candor, that "this stain on the national honor" cannot be wiped out by prevailing on the new Administration (if it could succeed in doing so) to have a new set of figures prepared for the purpose. Secretary Stanton's report of the number of prisoner's who died on both sides during the war was made July 19th, 1866; Surgeon-General Barnes' report of the number of deaths on both sides was made the next year, we believe—and the *National Intelligencer*, in an editorial of June 2d, 1869, collated and compared the figures of the two reports. Southern and foreign papers took hold of these figures and used them as a triumphant vindication of the Confederacy. Now who doubts that if they were wrong the Departments at Washington would have corrected them—even if it had required their "entire clerical force for three years"—and who doubts that they have not been corrected simply because they are fully as favorable to the Federal side as they can be honestly made? These figures have passed into history, and they will be believed, even though the suggestion of *The Nation* should hereafter be adopted and other figures be cooked up to serve a purpose.

But after all the gist of this whole discussion rests upon the simple question, *Did the Confederate Government order, sanction, or negligently permit cruelty to prisoners?* We think we proved beyond all reasonable doubt that it did neither.

*The Nation* tries to fix responsibility on Mr. Davis by a series of assertions, for which we respectfully demand the proof. It will be

difficult to get any one at all familiar with the high character of General Howell Cobb to believe the assertion that he refused to do anything to mitigate the condition of things at Andersonville "in the face of outspoken reports from the surgeons in charge." We gave the famous Chandler report, and accompanied it with letters from Hon. R. G. H. Kean, former Chief Clerk of the Confederate War Department, and ex-Secretary Seddon, showing conclusively that so far from failing to notice the statements in reference to Andersonville which Colonel Chandler made, not only did the Adjutant-General and the Assistant Secretary of War put the strong endorsements upon the report which we quoted, but the Secretary (Mr. Seddon) at once demanded of General Winder an explanation, which he gave, emphatically denying Colonel Chandler's charges—and that Colonel Chandler's request for a court of inquiry would have resulted in the fullest investigation, but that the active campaign then in progress rendered it utterly impracticable to hold the court until the matter was, unfortunately, ended by the death of General Winder. We showed, moreover, that Mr. Seddon at once, on the reception of the Chandler report, sent Judge Ould down the river, under flag of truce, to say to the Federal authorities, in substance: You have broken the cartel—you refuse now to stand by your own proposition to disregard all former paroles, and exchange man for man of prisoners actually in hand—you have refused my proposition that surgeons from each side be allowed to visit and provide for the prisoners—you refuse to exchange even the sick and wounded—you have declined my proposition to allow us to purchase hospital stores and medicines for the use of your own prisoners, paying you for them in cotton, tobacco or gold, and allowing you to send your own agents to distribute them, and now I tell you again that your men in our prisons are dying by the hundred from causes which are utterly beyond our control, and I am authorized by my Government to propose that if you will send transportation to Savannah we will at once deliver into your hands, *without equivalent*, from ten to fifteen thousand of your suffering soldiers. We affirmed, moreover (what we are prepared to prove), that so far from Mr. Davis' making the Chandler report the ground of the promotion of General Winder, *he did not see the report at the time, and never even heard of its existence* (he was in a casemate at Fortress Monroe when it was produced at the Wirz trial), *until some one told him of it in 1875.*

Judge Advocate Chipman labored to connect Mr. Davis with



this report during the Wirz trial, and yet, notwithstanding the fact that he had at his beck and call a band of trained perjurers, and Mr. Davis was in a distant prison and in ignorance of what was going on, the effort utterly failed. Equally futile was every other effort to connect Mr. Davis with the responsibility for the sufferings at Andersonville, until, in despair of any other evidence, an attempt was made to bribe poor Wirz by offering him, a short time before his execution, a reprieve if he would implicate Mr. Davis. He indignantly replied: "*Mr. Davis had no connection with me as to what was done at Andersonville.* I would not become a traitor against him or anybody else, even to save my life." We brought out the proofs of all these facts. Moreover we published the letter of Chief-Justice George Shea, to the New York *Tribune*, giving an account of his investigation of this question in behalf of Mr. Horace Greeley and other gentlemen who were unwilling to go on Mr. Davis' bail bond until the charge against him of cruelty to prisoners was cleared up. Judge Shea went to Canada and had access to certain Confederate archives which had escaped capture, and he investigated all of the "evidence" which the "Bureau of Military Justice" had at Washington. The result was that he was not only convinced himself, but succeeded in convincing such men as Governor Andrew, Horace Greeley, Gerritt Smith, Vice-President Wilson and Thaddeus Stevens, that the charge against Mr. Davis of even connivance at cruelty to prisoners was *utterly without foundation*.

The United States authorities did not dare to bring Mr. Davis to trial on this or on any other charge, simply because, after the most industrious efforts, they could find no testimony which created even a reasonable presumption of guilt. But these "judicial" gentlemen of *The Nation* undertake to convict where the "Bureau of Military Justice" hesitated, and affect to regard Mr. Davis' letter in reference to General Winder (a garbled clause of which they give and pervert) as settling his complicity with the "crime of Andersonville."

*The Nation* has not thought proper to meet our argument, which proved, beyond all reasonable doubt, that for the suspension of the cartel and the stoppage of exchange, the United States authorities alone were responsible. We traced the history of the exchange question, and gave the most indubitable proofs that the Confederates were *always* ready to exchange, but that so soon as Gettysburg and Vicksburg gave the United State Government a large excess of



prisoners actually in hand (though a large part of them should have been at once released to meet paroles already held by the Confederates), it at once adopted as its cold-blooded war policy to *refuse all further exchange of prisoners, while they satisfied the North by charging bad faith and cruelty to prisoners on the part of "the Rebels."*

*The Nation* seems to think that the question of exchange had nothing to do with the *treatment* of prisoners. Certainly the refusal of the United States authorities to exchange would not have justified the Confederates in cruelty to prisoners, and so far from contending for any such absurdity, we have proven that *there was no such cruelty on the part of our Government*. But we do insist that the suspension of exchange threw upon our hands thousands of prisoners whom we were unable to provide with suitable food, clothing, quarters or medicines—that the Federal authorities were again and again informed of the fearful mortality which existed among the prisoners, and of our inability to prevent it—and that inasmuch as they not only refused to exchange, but even to accept the several humane propositions we made to mitigate the sufferings of prisoners, and obstinately pursued their "attrition" policy of "crushing the rebellion"—*they (and they alone)* are responsible before God and at the bar of history for all of the suffering and mortality which existed at Andersonville and the other prisons at the South, and the still greater suffering and mortality of Elmira and the other prisons at the North.

*The Nation* also finds it convenient to ignore the testimony we adduced from Federal soldiers, officers, surgeons and citizens which traced the cruel treatment which our men received directly to *E. M. Stanton*, Secretary of War. On the other hand, we defy proof of an order, letter or intimation of any sort whatever from Mr. Davis, or any member of his cabinet, directing, permitting or in any way conniving at cruelty to prisoners. There are other points to which we have not space even to allude. But if *The Nation* really desires to get at the truth of this whole question, we would be most happy to discuss with it in full each one of the six points we claimed to have proven, and to *print in our Papers everything it has to say on the subject, if it will reciprocate*.

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**Garnett's Brigade at Gettysburg.**

[The following letter explains the report which follows, and which will be an addition to our series of reports on that great battle.]

CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA, March 23d, 1875.

*To the Secretary of the Southern Historical Society :*

Dear Sir—In looking up some old papers a few days ago, I found the inclosed report of the part taken by Garnett's brigade (first Cocke's, then Pickett's, then Garnett's, and lastly Hunton's) in the battle of Gettysburg.

I am not sure who is the author of the report, as it is unsigned, but am under the impression that Lieutenant-Colonel Charles S. Peyton, of the Nineteenth Virginia infantry, wrote or dictated it. Colonel Peyton (at that time Major of the Nineteenth Virginia) was the senior field officer who escaped from the charge on Cemetery Hill and took command of the brigade after the battle. Colonel Henry Gantt was badly wounded in two places, and Lieutenant-Colonel Ellis was killed, as is reported in these papers. Major Peyton was afterwards promoted to the vacant lieutenant-colonelcy. He had lost an arm at second Manassas, but returned to duty as soon as he was sufficiently recovered to do so, and did good service during the charge at Gettysburg. He was slightly wounded in the leg, but not disabled to such an extent as to prevent taking command of the brigade.

I was Adjutant of the Nineteenth Virginia during the greater part of the war, and presume that the report fell into my hands in that way, although I had entirely lost sight of it.

Very respectfully,

CHARLES C. WERTENBAKER.

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HEADQUARTERS GARNETT'S BRIGADE,  
*Camp Near Williamsport, Maryland, July 9th, 1863.*

Major C. PICKETT, *A. A. G. Pickett's Division :*

Major—In compliance with instructions from division headquarters, I have the honor to report the part taken by this brigade in the late battle near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, July 3d, 1863.

Notwithstanding the long and severe marches made by the troops of this brigade, they reached the field about 9 o'clock A. M., in high spirits and in good condition. At about 12 M. we were

ordered to take position behind the crest of the hill on which the artillery, under Colonel Alexander, was planted, where we lay during a most terrific cannonading, which opened at 1½ o'clock P. M. and was kept up without intermission for one hour. During the shelling we lost about twenty killed and wounded; among the killed was Lieutenant-Colonel Ellis, of the Nineteenth Virginia, whose bravery as a soldier, and his innocence, purity and integrity as a Christian, has not only elicited the admiration of his own command, but endeared him to all who knew him.

At 2½ P. M. the artillery fire having to some extent abated, the order to advance was given, first by Major-General Pickett in person, and repeated by General Garnett. With promptness, apparent cheerfulness and alacrity, the brigade moved forward at "quick-time." The ground was open, but little broken, and from 800 to 1,000 yards from the crest whence we started to the enemy's line. The brigade moved in good order, keeping up its line almost perfect, notwithstanding it had to climb three high post and rail fences, behind the last of which the enemy's skirmishers were first met and immediately driven in. Moving on, we soon met the advance line of the enemy, lying concealed in the grass on the slope, about one hundred yards in front of his second line, which consisted of a stone wall, about breast high, running nearely parallel to and about thirty spaces from the crest of the hill which was lined with their artillery.

The first line referred to above, after offering some resistance, was completely routed and driven in confusion back to the stone wall. Here we captured some prisoners, which were ordered to the rear without a guard. Having routed the enemy here, General Garnett ordered the brigade forward, which was promptly obeyed, loading and firing as they advanced.

Up to this time we had suffered but little from the enemy's batteries, which apparently had been much crippled previous to our advance, with the exception of one posted on the mountain about one mile to our right, which enfiladed nearly our entire line, with fearful effect, sometimes having as many as ten men killed and wounded by the bursting of a single shell.

From the point it had first routed the enemy, the brigade moved rapidly forward towards the stone wall, under a galling fire, both from artillery and infantry, the artillery using grape and canister.

We were now within about seventy-five paces of the wall, unsupported on the right and left; General Kemper being some fifty

or sixty yards behind and to the right, and General Armistead coming up in our rear. General Kemper's line was discovered to be lapping on ours, when, deeming it advisable to have the line extended on the right to prevent being flanked, a staff officer rode back to the General to request him to incline to the right. General Kemper not being present (perhaps wounded at the time), Captain Fry of his staff immediately began his exertions to carry out the request, but in consequence of the eagerness of the men in pressing forward, it was impossible to have the order carried out.

Our line, much shattered, still kept up the advance until within about twenty paces of the wall, when for a moment they recoiled under the terrific fire that poured into our ranks both from their batteries and from their sheltered infantry.

At this moment General Kemper came up on the right and General Armistead in rear, when the three lines, joining in concert, rushed forward with unyielding determination, and an apparent spirit of laudable rivalry to plant the Southern banner on the walls of the enemy.

His strongest and last line was instantly gained, the Confederate battle flag waved over his defences, and the fighting over the wall became hand to hand and of the most desperate character, but more than half having already fallen, our line was found too weak to rout the enemy. We hoped for a support on the left (which had started simultaneously with ourselves), but hoped in vain. Yet, a small remnant remained in desperate struggle, receiving a fire in front, on the right and on the left, many even climbing over the wall and fighting the enemy in his own trenches, until entirely surrounded, and those who were not killed or wounded were captured, with the exception of about 300, who came off slowly but greatly scattered—the identity of every regiment being entirely lost, every regimental commander killed or wounded.

The brigade went into action with 1,287 men and about 140 officers, as shown by the report of the previous evening, and sustained a loss, as the list of casualties will show, of 941 killed, wounded and missing, and it is feared from all the information received that the majority of those reported missing are either killed or wounded.

It is needless, perhaps, to speak of conspicuous gallantry where all behaved so well. Each and every regimental commander displayed a cool bravery and daring that not only encouraged their own commands, but won the highest admiration from all those who

saw them. They led their regiments in the fight, and showed by their conduct that they only desired their men to follow where they were willing to lead.

But of our cool, gallant, noble brigade commander, it may not be out of place to speak. Never had the brigade been better handled, and never has it done better service on the field of battle.

There was scarcely an officer or man in the command whose attention was not attracted by the cool and handsome bearing of General Garnett, who, totally devoid of excitement or rashness, rode immediately in rear of his advancing line, endeavoring by his personal efforts and by the aid of his staff to keep his line well closed and dressed.

He was shot from his horse while near the centre of the brigade, within about twenty-five paces of the stone wall. This gallant officer was too well known to need further mention.

Captain Linthicum, A. A. G., Lieutenant Jones, A. D. C., and Lieutenant Harrison, acting A. D. C., did their whole duty and won the admiration of the entire command by their gallant bearing on the field while carrying orders from one portion of the line to the other where it seemed almost impossible for any one to escape. The conduct of Captain Shepard, of the Twenty-eighth Virginia, was particularly conspicuous. His son fell mortally wounded at his side. He stopped but for a moment to look on his dying son, gave him his canteen of water, and pressed on with his company to the wall, which he climbed and fought the enemy with his sword in their own trenches, until his sword was wrenched from his hands by two Yankees. He finally made his escape in safety.

In making the above report, I have endeavored to be as accurate as possible, but have had to rely mainly on others for information whose position gave them better opportunity for witnessing the conduct of the entire brigade, than I could have, being with and paying my attention to my own regiment.

I am, Major, with great respect, your obedient servant,

—————, *Major Commanding.*

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**Part Taken by the Ninth Virginia Cavalry in Repelling the Dahlgren Raid.**

By General R. L. T. BEALE.

[We have held this paper with the purpose of publishing it in connection with the full history of the Dahlgren raid, which we have in course of preparation, but we have concluded to give it in the form in which it has been sent by its gallant author].

*An Extract from a Narrative of the Movements of the Ninth Regiment Virginia Cavalry in the Late War—Written from Notes taken at the time by its Colonel, R. L. T. Beale.*

Near the close of February, a third order was received to report without delay at Hanover Junction for orders. We marched upon this, as we did upon the two previous occasions, sixty miles in twenty-four hours. Reaching the Junction, we found no orders; but learning here that the enemy, under General Kilpatrick, were making a raid upon Richmond, so soon as a supply of ammunition was drawn our march was directed to Taylorsville. At this point, a general officer commanding some infantry informed us the enemy had been repulsed by General Hampton's command, and must retreat towards the Rapidan, and we would probably encounter them near Ashland. To Ashland our march was directed. In some two miles of this point, reliable intelligence was obtained that the main body of the enemy was near Old Church, but that a party of some four hundred had moved upon the road to Hanover Courthouse. Our line of march was now directed to that point, reaching it about dark, only to learn our enemy had passed without halting.

Rest and food for men and horses were now much needed, and the command bivouacked around a church a few hundred yards from Hanover Courthouse. Before our meal of cold bread was over, a prisoner, taken under such suspicious circumstances as to induce the belief that he was a Yankee, was sent in by the picket. He was subjected to a rigid examination by the Colonel, who got from him information not very agreeable. The man had been captured in the morning, and after hard usage, made his escape in the evening from a body of cavalry, which he said was commanded by a Colonel Dahlgren. They had passed in sight of Hanover Courthouse, moving to Indiantown ferry, over the Pamunkey, where about one-fourth of the party crossed the river, the remaining three-fourths moving down the south bank towards Old Church.

He also said he heard that the force which crossed had orders to march by Saluda to Gloucester Point. In this route the direct road would lead to our camp in Essex.

A tried soldier was summoned at once and provided with authority to impress horses, was charged with an order to the senior officer at camp, and required to deliver it by dawn of the morning. So soon as the horses had eaten, the bugle sounded to horse, and we moved down the south side of Pamunkey. Before dawn our advance was halted by a picket near Old Church.

It proved to be that of Colonel Bradley T. Johnson. We halted for breakfast, then marched to Tunstall's Station, to which point Colonel Johnson moved to ambush. We saw only the half extinct fires of the Yankee camp and evidences of ruin to the helpless families near the road, and after a bootless chase, returned in the evening to bivouac at the intersection of the New Castle and New Kent roads, one mile from Old Church, to await the return of a courier sent to General Hampton in the morning. Whilst seated around our camp-fire, a courier—Private Robbins, of New Kent—rode in, and asked for Colonel Beale. He bore a dispatch from Lieutenant James Pollard, of Company H, who was absent from camp when we marched, and a package of papers. From the dispatch we learned that Pollard, hearing of a party of the enemy in the county, hastily collected twelve of his men, and crossing the Mattaponi, took position on the south bank at Dunkirk to dispute their passage over the bridge. After waiting some time, he learned the enemy had found a boat and crossed at Aylett's, two miles lower down. He immediately pursued them, and availing himself of his perfect familiarity with the country, succeeded before nightfall in getting in front of them. On reaching the road of the enemy's march, he met a homeguard company, under command of Captain Richard Hugh Bagby, with several lieutenants and some privates from other regular regiments, ready to dispute the advance of the enemy. Falling back until a good position was reached, the men were posted and darkness closed in. No advance after dark was expected. A lieutenant was left in command on the road. About 11 o'clock the tramp of horses was heard. When within twenty or thirty paces the officer commanded "Halt!" The reply was "Disperse, you damned Rebels, or I shall charge you." "Fire!" ordered the lieutenant, and under it the horsemen retreated rapidly. Their leader had fallen, as his horse wheeled, killed instantly. Deserted by their officers, the men next morning, on the flats below



the hill, hoisted the white flag. The papers found on Colonel Dahlgren's person accompanied the dispatch. Nearly every paper had been copied in a memorandum book; they consisted of an address to the command, the order of attack from the south side of the James upon the city of Richmond, enjoining the release of the prisoners, the killing of the executive officers of the Confederate Government, the burning and gutting of the city, directions where to apply for the materials necessary to setting fire to the city, and an accurate copy of the last field return of our cavalry made to General Stuart, with the location of every regiment. This last was furnished by the Bureau of Instruction at Washington. The rest were credited to no one. We forwarded all the papers by Pollard's courier to Richmond. The memorandum book was retained. After the publication of the papers and the denial of their authenticity, we were interrogated and ordered to forward the memorandum book, which was done.

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## Editorial Paragraphs.

AN EXTENSION OF OUR CIRCULATION is very desirable on many accounts. We can be useful only as our *Papers* are circulated; and we need a larger list of subscribers in order that we may have the means of properly carrying on our important work. Will not our friends generally help us in this matter? *Let each subscriber endeavor to secure for us a new one.* And let our present subscribers not fail to renew when their time is out. If we can have the cordial co-operation and active help of our friends, our capacity for usefulness will be greatly enlarged.

DONATIONS TO THE FUNDS OF THE SOCIETY were contemplated in our original organization, but the condition of the South has been such that we have not made appeals in that direction.

We have received a large number of donations of books, MSS., documents, pamphlets, &c., of very great pecuniary value; but, with the exception of a liberal contribution of \$1,000 from one large-hearted friend of the cause, we have received very little money except in payment of subscriptions. Now we begin to feel the great need of larger means with which to carry on our work—to purchase books, MSS., &c., which we cannot otherwise secure, to print more of our MSS., and to carry out various plans for the enlarged usefulness of the Society. We have to compete to some extent with the great historical societies which have their splendid buildings and ample endowments, and we really do not know how friends of the South could more judiciously invest funds just now than by contributions to this Society, which has for its object the preservation of the records, and the vindication of the history of the Confederacy.

We will say, then, frankly, that if there are those who are able and willing to help us, donations would be at this time particularly acceptable, and that any contributions made to us will be sacredly used in accordance with the wishes of the donors.

THE FIRE WHICH DESTROYED THE PRIVATE RESIDENCE OF THE SECRETARY, over a month ago, was not alluded to in these columns, because we are not accustomed to introduce into them mere private matters. But as an impression has gone abroad that important papers belonging to the Society were destroyed, it becomes proper to say that the archives of the Society are kept in our office in the State Capitol—that they are under constant guard—and are as safe as the Library and archives of the Commonwealth.

While, therefore, the Secretary lost his private library, most of his furniture, &c., *nothing* belonging to the Southern Historical Society was either destroyed or injured.

THE correction given below is a very proper one, though we are not quite sure whether the mistake was Mr. Hollyday's, or a typographical error :

Rev. J. WILLIAM JONES, D. D.,

*Secretary Southern Historical Society, Richmond Virginia :*

Dear Sir—Mr. Lamar Hollyday in his narrative of the "Maryland troops in the Confederate Service," published in the March number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, states that Captain Latrobe, of the Third battery of Maryland artillery, was killed at Vicksburg, Mississippi. That is a mistake. His report of the Third Maryland artillery should read thus : Captain Henry B. Latrobe, commissioned September 9th, 1861 ; left the service March 1st, 1863. Captain Ferd. O. Claiborne, promoted March 1st, 1863 ; killed at Vicksburg, Mississippi, June 22d, 1863.

Please make the above correction, and much oblige, yours truly,

WILLIAM L. RITTER.

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND, April 5th, 1877.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO OUR ARCHIVES are always in order, and the kindness of our friends in this respect is most warmly appreciated. With no means of purchasing books or documents, the free will offerings of those interested in our work are filling our shelves with historic material which money could not buy. Since our last acknowledgement we have received among others the following :

*From Rev. J. A. French*—Letter book containing official copies of letters written by the Confederate Secretary of the Treasury. Letter file containing letters received in 1861 at Register's office Confederate Treasury Department.

*From Colonel Charles Ellis, Richmond*—A package of war newspapers carefully selected and preserved because of something valuable in each. "Ordinances adopted by the Convention of Virginia in secret session in April and May, 1861." Virginia "Ordinance of Secession." "Report of the Chief of Ordnance of Virginia (Colonel C. Dimmock), for the year ending September 30th, 1861. "Message of the Governor of Virginia" (Hon. John Letcher), December 7th, 1863. Letter from General C. F. Henningsen in reply to the letter of Victor Hugo on the Harper's Ferry invasion." "Discourse on the Life and Character of Lieutenant-General Thomas J. Jackson," by General F. H. Smith, Superintendent Virginia Military Institute, read before the Board of Visitors, Faculty and Cadets, July 1st, 1863, together with proceedings of the Institution in honor of the illustrious deceased."

*From the American Colonization Society*—A full set of the annual reports, addresses, &c., of the Society. "Memorial of the Semi-Centennial Anniversary of the American Colonization Society, celebrated at Washington, January 15th, 1867."

*From Judge W. S. Barton, Fredericksburg, Virginia*—A bundle of official papers relating to the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, which were put into his hands as Judge Advocate of the Court of Inquiry which was ordered by the Confederate War Department to investigate those disasters. The package contains such papers as the following : Report of General R. Taylor of operations in North Louisiana from June 3d to 8th, 1863 ; correspondence between the Secretary of War and General J. E. Johnston, from the 9th of

May to the 20th of June, 1863; correspondence between the President and and General J. E. Johnston; correspondence and reports showing the efforts made to provision Vicksburg and Port Hudson; reports of the ordnance Department as to the issues of ordnance, percussion, caps, &c., to Vicksburg and Port Hudson; and a number of letters, telegrams, reports, &c., bearing on the whole question of the defence and final capitulation of those posts.

*From J. D. Davidson, Esq., Lexington, Virginia*—A copy of the *Augusta (Georgia), Chronicle* for 1817.

*From Norval Ryland, Esq., Richmond*—Copy of the *Richmond Dispatch*, containing full account of the battle of Seven Pines.

*From J. L. Peyton, Esq., Staunton, Virginia*—"The American Crisis, or pages from the Note Book of a State Agent during the Civil War, by John Lewis Peyton." London: Saunders, Otley & Co., 1867 (two volumes).

*From the Author (George Wise, Esq.) Alexandria, Virginia*—"History of the Seventeenth Virginia Infantry, Confederate States Army." Baltimore: Kelly, Piet & Co., 1870.

*From A. Barron Holmes, Esq., Charleston, South Carolina*—"Fort Moultrie Centennial," being a beautifully illustrated account of the celebration at Fort Moultrie, Sullivan's Island, Charleston (South Carolina) harbor on June 28th, 1876. "Judge O'Neale's Annals of Newberry District, South Carolina." "Logan's History of Upper South Carolina" (volume I). (Mr. Holmes frequently places the Society under obligations for similar favors).

*From the Society of the Army of the Tennessee*—Report of proceedings at tenth annual meeting held at Washington, D. C., on the occasion of unveiling the equestrian statue of Major-General James B. McPherson.

*From Colqnel F. H. Archer, of Petersburg*—A bundle of very interesting original papers (reports, letters, telegrams, &c.) of operations and movements about Suffolk, Smithfield, &c., in the spring of 1862.

*From General Fitz. Lee*—Sketch of the life and character of the late General S. Cooper, Senior General and Adjutant and Inspector-General of the Confederacy, together with a letter from ex-President Davis giving his impressions of General Cooper.

*From General J. A. Early, General Fitz. Lee, General E. P. Alexander, General A. L. Long, General Cadmus M. Wilcox, Colonel Walter H. Taylor and General Henry Heth*—Papers on the battle of Gettysburg. (These papers discuss the policy of invading the North, the plan of the campaign, the origin, conduct, events, result and causes of the result of the battle of Gettysburg and other points of deep interest, together with similar papers from other leading Confederates who were in a position to know whereof they affirm. This series of papers will do more to give to the world the true story of Gettysburg than anything that has yet been written, and with the full series of reports on the great battle which have already appeared, they will afford invaluable material to the historian who sincerely seeks after the truth. Among other points they settle beyond all controversy that General Lee had at Gettysburg only 62,000 effectives of all arms, while General Meade had 105,000 on the field, and at least 10,000 more within supporting distance).